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 4 
Introduction: The Reverie 
 
Imagine sitting by a lake. No one else is in sight. Your thoughts are free and time 
is insignificant. You are in a reverie. You could also be in a reverie when you are 
thinking about a philosophical conundrum, going over and over in your mind endless 
possibilities for how a certain social interaction could go or should go or did go, or 
passively not thinking about anything. What is a reverie? The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines it as “a moment or period of being lost, especially pleasantly, in one's thoughts; a 
day dream.”1 The English word comes from the French word reverie, which the 1762 
edition of the Dictionnaire de l’Académie française defines as “pensée où se laisse aller 
l'imagination” (thoughts in which the imagination lets itself go) or, alternatively, “délire 
causé par une maladie ou autrement” (delirium caused by one illness or another).2 As you 
can see, the word carried a mixture of positive and negative connotations. The examples 
given of the word’s usage include “agréable, douce rêverie" (pleasant, gentle reverie) and 
“Il se plaît dans ses reveries” (He delights in his reveries), but also “Cet ouvrage n'est pas 
sensé, ce ne sont que des rêveries de malade” (This text is not well thought out, it is only 
sick dreams). So reverie can indicate peaceful meditation or the psychological effects of 
an illness. The Oxford English Dictionary gives this definition for the Middle English 
version of the word, which entered English from Middle French around 1350 A.D.: “wild 
or uncontrolled behavior; wantonness, revelry,” and by the sixteenth century  it had come 
to mean “incoherent thinking, wandering of the mind.”3 Over the centuries, its 
                                                 
1
 "reverie, n.". Oxford English Dictionary Online. March 2014. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/164771?rskey=WLgr32&result=. The word “reverie” is also currently 
used as a musical term, but for the purposes of this discussion we will ignore that usage. 
2
 “reverie, s.f.”. Dictionnaire de l'Académie française, 4th Edition (1762). Translations by Corinne Tucker. 
3
 “reverie, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. 
 5 
connotations remained mixed and its definitions varied from “a state of joy or wild 
delight” to “a fit of fury” or “a[n]…impractical idea or theory; a deluded or unrealistic 
notion.” The word’s most permanent meaning shared between French and English was 
that of a daydream influenced by one’s imagination or by an illness, but the word also 
carried connotations of wildness or joy. 
By the time of the Enlightenment, intellectuals feared that reveries could lead to a 
number of undesirable outcomes due to lack of mental restraint. Terry Castle argues that 
reveries, as well as several other expressions of the growing eighteenth-century interest in 
strange or disturbing elements of the supernatural, became more common as an 
unintended result of the Enlightenment
4
 movement’s sometimes excessive emphasis on 
reason, the physical world, and scientific process.
5
 She identifies several other 
expressions of the "the morbid, the excessive, and the strange" in her collection of essays 
entitled The Female Thermometer, in which she studies the currents of thought that ran 
beneath the eighteenth century culture’s surface of rationality, stability, and progress. In 
“Phantasmagoria,” she argues that the cultural shift towards denying the existence of 
spirits, ghosts, and other supernatural apparitions caused people to internalize the idea of 
those beings.
6
 As a result, thoughts became able to “haunt” people by recurring in their 
imaginations. Certain thought habits, such as reveries, gave the imagination enough 
freedom that these haunting thoughts – the replacement for the belief that one could 
visually see a real ghost – took on their own terrifying agency. In “Spectral Politics,” she 
                                                 
4
 I realize that the Enlightenment developed in varying forms and at varying times in different European 
countries; here I am speaking about general trends of thought commonly associated with the 
Enlightenment. 
5
 Terry Castle, The Female Thermometer: Eighteenth Century Culture and the Invention of the Uncanny 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 7. 
6
 Ibid 143. 
 6 
describes the more widespread fear among proponents of the Enlightenment that reveries, 
along with several other mental habits,
7
 could produce hallucinations because they 
allowed the imagination to overthrow reason’s weak authority over the mind.8 Other 
negative consequences of reveries that Rousseau’s contemporaries feared, besides seeing 
ghosts, included the expression of improper erotic desire, an inability to perceive a clear 
distinction between the world of living humans and the world of the dead, and the state of 
separation from and inability to connect with reality due to the intensity of one’s focus on 
the imagined world.
9
 
Given the general attitude toward reveries developing among his contemporaries 
as the Enlightenment philosophy put down roots throughout Europe, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau must have known that he was inviting readers to question the morality, 
rationality, and seriousness of a work entitled Reveries of a Solitary Walker (1778). Yet 
as he often did, Rousseau confidently and blatantly set aside commonly accepted views 
on the subject in favor of his own, unique though it may be. He indulged in many of the 
activities that were warned against because of their propensity to produce reveries – he 
wandered through gardens examining plants, contemplated issues of philosophy, 
morality, and the nature and purpose of the universe, spent most of his last years in 
solitude, and generally allowed his mind to wander where it would. Reveries did result, 
and he called them a source of “sufficient, perfect, and full happiness, which leaves in the 
                                                 
7 Other activities that were thought to contribute to hallucinations included "too much study, brooding over 
obscure intellectual problems, reading into the night, excessive mourning, and, especially, overindulgence 
in poetic or erotic fancies" (Castle 175). Later, she lists the more physical (as opposed to mental) activities 
that some saw as leading to reveries and therefore to the likelihood of seeing ghosts: "too much solitude, 
sitting in gaudily decorated churches, walking in gardens and terraces (as opposed to along the seashore), 
opium chewing, corpulence," being hung-over, and "drumming with one's fingers on table tops" (183). 
8
 Ibid. 175. 
9
 Ibid. 56-58, 132-33. 
 7 
soul no void needing to be filled.”10 To him, reveries provided freedom from anxiety and 
painful memories by replacing them with whimsical imaginings, enjoyment of nature’s 
beauty, or simply an awareness of one’s existence (8, 55).  
Although he conveyed an openly positive attitude towards free-floating 
imagination and contemplation, he did not actually contradict any of the common 
objections to reveries. In the Second Walk, his complaints about his imagination’s 
waning power reveal the former effects of his reveries: he complains that he becomes 
“less intoxicated by the delirium or reverie” than he used to, confirming that his 
wandering imagination leads to “delirium” (11). He explicitly rejects reason’s guiding 
influence over his thoughts, declaring instead that he will “let my mind wander quite 
freely and my ideas follow their own course unhindered and untroubled.” He even admits 
that he uses reveries as a distraction from the pain that comes thinking about his real 
experiences (72). Furthermore, he even describes imaginary people whose company he 
enjoys: in the Eighth Walk, describing the reason for his contentment in solitude, he 
writes that “following my inclinations and indulging in the affections which attract me, 
my heart still feeds on the feelings for which it was created, and I enjoy them with 
imaginary beings who produce them and share them with me, as if these beings really 
existed” (90). This passage supports Castle’s idea that reveries facilitated the 
internalization of the idea of ghosts (although it is unclear whether the beings Rousseau 
describes have any spiritual or non-human qualities or whether they are simply non-
existent humans). 
                                                 
10
 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Reveries of a Solitary Walker, trans. Russel Goulbourne, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 55. Future references to Reveries will occur in the text. 
 8 
Nevertheless, Rousseau seems unbothered by these consequences of his 
daydreamings, and his overall attitude towards reveries is distinctly positive. I argue, 
however, that Rousseau does much more in Reveries of a Solitary Walker than work for a 
more positive perception of reveries; I argue that he inaugurated a new genre. Built 
around mental processes involved in the reverie and around the dreamer who engages in 
them, this genre, which I will also call a reverie, places central emphasis on the speaker’s 
internal experience and thought life. The dreamer is excessively self-aware and writes as 
an expression of his constantly churning thoughts. He denies that anyone other than 
himself will ever read what he has written and therefore does not seem to organize or 
filter his thoughts in order to make them presentable to an external audience.  
 
Rousseau’s attempt to capture his reveries in writing resulted in a type of memoir, 
autobiographical with respect to the narrator,
11
 dedicated to the expression of the his 
internal experiences. I will begin my study of the reverie genre with Rousseau’s Reveries 
of a Solitary Walker, which I will compare it to Rousseau’s Confessions, to which 
Reveries is often considered a sequel, in order to determine the reverie’s defining 
characteristics. Rousseau’s reverie also has generic roots in the essay, a literary form that 
Michel de Montaigne premiered in 1580 with his first collection of Essays. I will also 
comment on the characteristics that, I believe, distinguish a reverie from an essay.  
                                                 
11
 In Reveries of a Solitary Walker, this distinction is irrelevant because Rousseau the author is identical to 
Rousseau the narrator. In other reveries, the author speaks through a fictional narrator. Notes from 
Underground, for example, expresses the Underground Man’s reveries, not Dostoevsky’s. 
 9 
Then I will turn to Russian novelist Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes from 
Underground (1864), commonly categorized as a confession,
12
 and argue that it should 
more properly be considered a reverie. Written soon after the author’s return to St. 
Petersburg after years of exile and hard labor in Siberia, it expresses many of the author’s 
new and developing convictions regarding human nature, philosophy, and the state of 
society. Dostoevsky’s views, to the extent that they are discernible from Notes, are 
expressed through the persona of the Underground Man, the writer of the reverie, who 
embodies the philosophies Dostoevsky opposes.
13
 Notes comprises two parts. In the first 
part, the Underground Man introduces himself as a solitary, “hyperconscious” former 
government worker full of fabricated spite and a strange enjoyment of his own 
degradation.
14
 He goes on to express his deep rejection of the dominant culture among 
contemporary intellectuals who cherished rationality and material comfort as the ultimate 
goals of human and societal progress, holding instead to an absolute conviction that man 
must express irrational impulses and that he has spiritual needs that reason and wealth 
cannot satisfy. In Part II, the Underground Man recounts three episodes from an earlier 
period in his life that reveal the way his strange beliefs and warped perception of himself 
and of others shape his personal interactions. 
                                                 
12
 For example, see Barbara Howard, "The Rhetoric of Confession: Dostoevsky's Notes from Underground 
and Rousseau's Confessions,” The Slavic and East European Journal: 25.4 (1981 Winter), 16-32, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/307153. 
13
 Joseph Frank, Dostoevsky: A Writer in His Time (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 415. The 
Underground Man offers a perfect example of what Olga Stuchebrukhov calls an “idea-man:” a character 
designed, as are many of Dostoevsky’s, as a manifestation of an idea, which interacts with the other ideas 
as represented by other characters during the course of the novel. See Olga Stuchebrukhov, ‘‘'Ridiculous' 
Dream Versus Social Contract: Dostoevskij, Rousseau, and the Problem of Ideal Society," Studies in 
Eastern European Thought 57 (2007): 101, doi: 10.1007/s11212-007-9025-8.  
14
 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes from Underground and The Grand Inquisitor, ed. Ralph Matlaw (New York: 
Penguin, 1960), 6. Subsequent references will occur in the text. 
 10 
Allusions to Rousseau and especially to Confessions fill Dostoevsky’s work. 
Robin Miller identifies reflections, often purposely twisted ones, of Rousseau’s ideas or 
of episodes from Confessions in Dostoevsky’s The Insulted and Injured, Crime and 
Punishment, “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” and A Raw Youth, as well as Notes from 
Underground.
15
 Yet many of the Underground Man’s statements about himself and his 
writing project seem to imitate Rousseau’s in the Reveries. For example, the 
Underground Man also writes that he will allow his mind to wander and write down his 
thoughts without organizing them in any orderly way (Notes 37). He denies the existence 
of any audience other than himself but gives the reader reason to believe that, like 
Rousseau in Reveries, he does intend for his work to be read. He identifies himself as a 
dreamer and gives the reader glimpses of the contents of his warped imaginings (52). 
Like Rousseau, he comments on his own dreams; but unlike Rousseau, he acknowledges 
reveries’ dangers, which include moral degradation and disconnection from reality (121). 
By comparing Rousseau’s Reveries of a Solitary Walker and Dostoevsky’s Notes from 
Underground, I expect to reach a fuller understanding of the characteristics of the reverie 
genre and of the connection between the genre and the strange psychological condition of 
both narrators. 
 Although Rousseau and the Underground Man share similar experiences of 
reverie and hyperconsciousness, their responses to their own conditions are strikingly 
opposed to one another. They agree that reason, science, and wealth cannot satisfy men’s 
souls, but while Rousseau boldly claims to be the source of his own satisfaction (Reveries 
11), the Underground Man longs for “something different, quite different, for which I 
long but which I cannot find” either within himself or in the society suffering, according 
                                                 
15
 Robin F. Miller, Dostoevsky’s Unfinished Journey, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 88. 
 11 
to his view, from the Enlightenment’s influence (Notes 35). Exercising his imagination 
supposedly gives Rousseau endless enjoyment, but the Underground Man says that his 
dreams, though attractive, cannot permanently satisfy (52). Rousseau claims to enjoy his 
solitude because it facilitates contemplation and because he has not found other men 
worthy of his trust or respect (Reveries 65, 86), and although the Underground Man 
believes the same things, he nevertheless acknowledges his desire for reconciliation with 
those to whom he considers himself superior but finds himself unable relate (Notes 62, 
73). I propose that one explanation for the difference in their responses is their physical 
environment: Rousseau finds comfort in nature’s beauty, while the Underground Man 
lives in a “wretched, horrid [room] on the outskirts” of St. Petersburg (5). Also, the 
Underground Man is a fictional satire created to provide social commentary,
16
 while 
Rousseau simply records his own experiences. 
 Finally, my third chapter will examine T. S. Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock” (1911), which I argue is a modern example of a reverie and part of the link 
between the reverie mode and twentieth century stream of consciousness technique. 
Although the poem’s structure differs significantly from those of Notes from 
Underground and Reveries of a Solitary Walker, James Knapp writes that the poem’s 
“structure simply traced the shape of [Prufrock’s] thought and feeling, his struggle to gain 
the freedom of self-knowledge,”17 mirroring the other reveries’ organization and purpose. 
The contents of Prufrock’s meditations differ as well: rather than abstract philosophy or 
                                                 
16
 In Dostoevsky’s footnote to the title of Part 1 in Notes from Underground, Dostoevsky introduces his 
narrator as “one of the representatives of the current generation” who is himself “imaginary” but represents 
“persons [who]…not only may, but positively must, exist in our society, considering the circumstances 
under which our society was in general formed” (3). 
17
 James F. Knapp, "Eliot's 'Prufrock' and the Form of Modern Poetry," Arizona Quarterly: A Journal of 
American Literature, Culture, and Theory: 30 (1974), 14. 
 12 
past memories, Prufrock is immersed in the terrifying dilemma of whether to express his 
romantic interest in a woman he has the opportunity to visit. The poem appears to give 
the reader access to thoughts Prufrock would be thinking regardless of the readers’ 
presence; like Reveries of a Solitary Walker, the poem serves as a window into an active 
mind ostensibly unconcerned with its reader and drifting from calm contemplation to 
passive observation of surroundings to angst-filled confrontations with memories, 
questions, and self-doubt. Prufrock has no central message to communicate to an external 
listener but seems to be trying to reconcile himself to an uncomfortable situation, 
determine the best actionm or understand his inaction. So both Prufrock’s internal 
experience and the mode in which he expresses them qualify “The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock” as a reverie along with Rousseau’s and Dostoevsky’s. 
Like Notes from Underground, “The Long Song of J. Afred Prufrock” shares 
more than form with its predecessors. Rousseau’s and Dostoevsky’s influences on Eliot’s 
writing are not as explicit as Rousseau’s on Dostoevsky, but are undeniable nonetheless. 
During his few years in Paris between graduating from Harvard and returning there for 
his graduate study, Eliot studied under Alain Fournier, who encouraged him to read 
Dostoevsky. Louis Simpson attributes "the breaking down of orderly thought" in Eliot’s 
writing to Dostoevsky’s influence.18 Several scholars point out that Eliot had been 
reading Crime and Punishment in French shortly before writing “The Love Song of J. 
Alfred Prufrock” and compare Prufrock to Raskolnikov.19 Like Prufrock, Raskolnikov 
wanders through the city, haunted by rambling thoughts and bearing the weight of awful 
                                                 
18
 Louis Simpson, “T. S. Eliot, or Religion” in Three on the Tower, (New York: Morrow 1975), 101.  
19
 See Peter Lowe’s article, “Prufrock in St. Petersburg: The Presence of Dostoevsky’s Crime and 
Punishment in T. S. Eliot’s ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’” in Journal of Modern Literature, 28.3 
(2005 Spring), 1-24. Robert Fleissner also mentions Eliot’s study of Crime and Punishment in his book, 
Ascending the Prufrockian Stair: Studies in a Dissociated Sensibility, (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 50. 
 13 
indecision as he faces a dilemma. Prufrock also invites comparison to Raskolnikov when 
he justifies his current indecision and inaction by saying, “There will be time to murder” 
(line 28).
20
 I argue, however, that studying the relationship between Prufrock and the 
Underground Man also provides insight into Eliot’s speaker. 
During his undergraduate study at Harvard, Eliot studied under Irving Babbitt,
 
 
from whom he learned a set of literary values that shaped his taste as a critic and his goals 
as a poet. Babbitt expresses these views in Rousseau and Romanticism (1911), where he 
argues that the Romantic artists and writers (of which he considered Rousseau an 
archetype) produced inferior art because they considered reason and imagination 
incompatible.
21
 Combined with their confidence in humans’ innate virtue, this belief 
motivated the Romantics to abandon reason and order in art for the sake of eccentricity, 
emotionalism, and individual self-expression.
22
 Babbitt argues that “disciplined” art, 
which imitates classical models and depends on both imagination and reason, is far 
superior.
23
 Eliot thoroughly adopted Babbitt’s view, and in a sense shaped his whole 
career as a response against Romantic (and therefore Rousseauistic) aesthetic principles. 
His choice to write a poem that shares so many literary features with Reveries of a 
Solitary Walker therefore indicates some unique merit in that generic form, since he was 
otherwise prone to oppose anything identified with Rousseau. I will argue that the reverie 
genre best captures the internal experiences of a hyperconscious narrator. Although 
Prufrock, like the Underground Man, is a fictional speaker, his condition parallels both 
                                                 
20
 Lowe, “Prufrock in St. Petersburg,” 9; Fleissner, Ascending the Prufrockian Stair, 187. 
21
 Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), 353.  
22
 Ibid. 127. 
23
 Ibid. 353-54. 
 14 
the Underground Man’s and Rousseau’s and demonstrates the potential similarity of 
human experiences across centuries and continents. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 The Celebration of Reverie: Rousseau’s Reveries of a Solitary Walker 
 
 
 In Reveries of a Solitary Walker, Rousseau compares his current writing project 
both to his earlier Confessions and to Michel de Montaigne’s Essays. I argue that despite 
these two works’ undeniable influence on Reveries of a Solitary Walker, Reveries itself 
deserves its own category. Montaigne asserts that solitude is ideal for contemplation and 
purports to record his wandering thoughts. Rousseau incorporates both of those elements 
into Reveries, but he presents his ideas within the overall context of introspection. For 
Montaigne, although he describes how he reached his conclusions, the ideas themselves 
are central; in Reveries of a Solitary Walker and other members of the reverie mode, the 
narrator’s internal experience receives the emphasis. When we compare Rousseau’s 
Confessions to his Reveries, we see a similar distinction. Confessions portrays Rousseau 
as confident of his own identity and determined to communicate his knowledge to the 
public. Reveries, on the other hand, conveys doubt in the accuracy of his own self-
perception, reveals internal conflicts, and therefore has no overt intention to present a 
determined message to an external audience. These distinctions, I argue, earn recognition 
for the reverie as a separate literary mode. 
 
The Reverie Genre 
Rousseau has a long history of standing alone against generally-accepted views 
and practices. Born in Geneva, a stronghold of Protestantism, Jean-Jacques ran away and 
converted to Catholicism at age sixteen. He tried to develop a unique system of musical 
 16 
notation
24
 and first earned fame among intellectuals by rejecting core principles of the 
Enlightenment in his Discours sur les sciences et les arts, or Discourse on the Sciences 
and Arts (1750), in which he argued that academic and scientific advancement actually 
brings moral corruption rather than human progress and refinement.
25
 He carried this 
claim even further in Discours sur l'origine et les fondements de l'inégalité parmi les 
hommes, or Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men (1754). In this 
essay Rousseau argued that not only the acquisition of scientific and academic knowledge 
but living in civilized society at all causes degeneration of character, which is most pure 
when man lives independently in nature.  
But Rousseau’s intellectual views were not the only distinguishing marks that set 
him apart from most of his contemporaries; he made unconventional personal choices as 
well. Having decided in his youth that at age forty he would “end…my efforts to succeed 
socially and…all my aspirations,” in 1752 he resigned from his job and gave up wearing 
fine clothes.
26
 This decision also served as an illustration of his unconventional views 
expressed in the First Discourse – he had written that social prestige and material 
comforts offered little benefit, and now he chose to live accordingly.
27
 Not all his choices 
reconciled discrepancies between his stated beliefs and his lifestyle, however; having 
                                                 
24
 Maurice Cranston, Jean-Jacques: The Early Life and Work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 1712-1754 (New 
York: Norton, 1983), 157. 
25
 Maurice Cranston, The Noble Savage: Jean-Jacques Rousseau 1754-62 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1991), xiii. 
26
 Rousseau, Reveries of a Solitary Walker, 23.  
27
 Rousseau was often considered a member of the Cynic tradition, referring to those who adhered to the 
teachings of Diogenes the Cynic (approx. 407-322 BC). This decision withdraw from social prestige is 
consistent with Diogenes’ values. Diogenes scorned societal influence and material comforts and 
encouraged his followers to seek “absolute physical and intellectual self-sufficiency.” David Mazella, The 
Making of Modern Cynicism (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2007), 13. 
 17 
written extensively on education and child-development,
28
 Rousseau left all five of his 
children at the Foundling Hospital in Montemorency with no records of their identities.
29
 
Given Rousseau’s unconventional intellectual positions and personal decisions, it 
is not surprising that he also broke many literary conventions as well. Years of expressing 
of controversial opinions brought him social rejection, intellectual and literary opposition, 
and eventually political exile. After gradually losing supporters and friends for years, 
sometimes because of their opposition to his beliefs and sometimes because of personal 
conflicts,
30
 Rousseau found himself in real isolation that led him to self-reflection and 
autobiographical writings during his last years. The first and most well-known is 
Confessions,
31 
written between 1766 and 1770 and published after his death.
32
 In 1776, he 
completed Rousseau, Juge de Jean-Jacques. Dialogues (or Dialogues: Rousseau, Judge 
of Jean-Jacques)
33
 and finally Reveries of a Solitary Walker, on which I will focus as the 
                                                 
28
 These were the central topics of Emile (1762). 
29
 Cranston, The Noble Savage, 286. 
30
 Ibid. 290; Maurice Cranston, The Solitary Self: Jean-Jacques Rousseau in Exile and Adversity (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 156-59. 
31
 Lionel Gossman, in his article “The Innocent Art of Reverie and Confession,” distinguishes among 
several varieties of autobiographical writing, including confession and reverie. First, he identifies other 
members of the literary tradition of confession with which Rousseau associates his by choosing that title 
(60). Two primary works are Augustine’s Confessions (398 A. D.) and Confessions du Comte de ***, by 
Rousseau’s contemporary philosopher Charles Duclos (1741). Gossman argues that Rousseau continues the 
tradition of confession by attempting to convey essential truths about the self and contribute to general 
knowledge of human nature in the process (63, 65). He breaks literary conventions, however, with his 
inclusion of extensive, specific, personal details (61). Lionel Gossman,“The Innocent Art of Confession 
and Reverie,” Daedalus, 107.3 (1978 Summer): 59-77, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20024564. Rousseau’s 
willingness to provide even inappropriate details about himself provides another point of comparison to 
Diogenes. Diogenes believed that the task of a philosopher was to “challenge the conventional values, 
beliefs, and customs of the community” often through “outrageous behavior and jokes” (Mazella, The 
Making of Modern Cynicism, 14). Rousseau accomplished that task both through his unconventional views 
and the actions and motivations described in his Confessions. Associating him with Cynicism, many of his 
contemporaries considered him a counterexample to the common image of philosophes as epitomizing 
social propriety and the Enlightenment values of refinement and rational progress (111). 
32
 The first six books were published in 1782; Books Seven through Twelve were published in 1789. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Confessions (New York: Knopf, 1992), xviii.  
33
 Dialogues serves as a transitional piece between Confessions and Reveries of a Solitary Walker. We will 
not study it in depth, but it is helpful to note that in it Rousseau seeks to justify himself before the public, 
an endeavor he began in Confessions. “Rousseau” carries on a conversation with “The Frenchman” about 
Jean-Jacques, who represents Rousseau as commonly perceived by his contemporary intellectuals. 
 18 
initiating work of the reverie genre. Rousseau began Reveries of a Solitary Walker in 
1776; they remained unfinished at his death in 1778. Rousseau identified Reveries as an 
“appendix to my Confessions” but hints at qualitative differences in content by saying, 
“that is not the title I give [these pages], for I no longer feel I have anything to say which 
is worthy of it” (Reveries 12). Reveries are not the same as his Confessions, but they are 
related. In order to determine the connections and contrasts between these two works, we 
will first examine certain aspects of Confessions.  
 First, let us consider Rousseau’s purpose in writing Confessions. I identify three 
stated, primary purposes, all of which Rousseau states or alludes to in the Foreward to 
Confessions. These purposes are self-revelation, contribution to the general study of 
human nature, and self-justification. The latter two flow from the first. He opens Book 
One with this purpose statement: “I mean to lay open to my fellow-mortals a man just as 
nature wrought him; and this man is myself. …I have freely told both good and bad, have 
hid nothing wicked, added nothing good” (3). He repeats a similar but elaborated idea in 
Book Four, reminding his reader of his reason for including so much detail:  
I strive, everywhere, to lay the first causes quite open, to make you feel connexion 
of effects. I want to be able…to render my heart transparent to the sight of the 
reader; …to speak in such a manner that a single movement shall not pass but he 
shall perceive it, in order that he may judge himself of the principle which 
produces it. (158) 
 
 In order to accomplish this goal, Rousseau begins a detailed, chronological account of 
his life. He describes his family, education, travels, occupations, and relationships – both 
friendships and romantic relationships – and regularly explains his motivations and the 
emotions that led to or resulted from the actions or circumstances he describes. In order 
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to narrate his life understandably, he gives complete explanations and proceeds in a 
logical, time-sequential manner so that his intended audience – the public – will easily 
grasp the biographical information he presents.  
Rousseau’s Foreward states two additional purposes for Confessions, both of 
which depend on his ability to reveal his character accurately. He charges his readers not 
to destroy Confessions because it serves as “an useful and unique work…a first sketch for 
that study of men” (2). In other words, he believes that by exposing himself, he 
contributes material to humanity’s quest to understand human nature. Like Augustine, he 
hopes that his confession will provide some “moral edification” to his readers.34  
Finally, Rousseau hopes that by presenting to the public a more truthful account 
of his life and character than he believes them to have previously encountered, he will 
vindicate himself before them. He calls Confessions “the only assured monument of my 
character which my enemies have not defaced” (2), implying that all other 
representations of himself have been damaged and therefore no longer represent him 
accurately. Their inaccuracy explains the public’s poor view of him, Rousseau seems to 
say, and he strives through Confessions to give them a better basis on which to judge him. 
Rousseau’s tone throughout Confessions as he comments on his actions confirms that 
self-justification is his central purpose. For example, he describes stealing a ribbon to 
give to Marion, a fellow servant in the Vercellis household. When discovered, he blamed 
her for stealing it and giving it to him (76-78). After a step-by-step summary of his 
choices to steal the ribbon and to blame her, of the adults’ responses, of her pleas with 
him to tell the truth and of his stubbornness, Rousseau begins to explain the reason for his 
refusal to take responsibility. He writes, “I little feared punishment, I dreaded the shame 
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only; but I dread it more than death, more than the crime, more than the whole world.” 
He categorizes fear of shame as a “weakness” rather than a true vice, however, and goes 
on to minimize his wrong-doing. Seeking to avert judgment, he explains, “My age is 
likewise an allowance it is but just to make. In youth enormous crimes are still more 
criminal than in an age of maturity; but mere weakness is much less so, and my fault at 
bottom was very little more.” Although he acknowledges his “fault,” he attempts 
diminish the harshness of the reader’s judgment on him by identifying the source of his 
fear and his attributing his weakness to his youth. Confessions is filled with comments of 
similar tone in which Rousseau explains himself in order to gain a more favorable 
reaction.  
In summary, Rousseau intended Confessions to present a complete self-image to 
the public, an image he hoped would both contribute to the general understanding of 
human nature and, more importantly to him, exonerate him. This endeavor requires 
logical organization of content, so Rousseau narrates his life in chronological order. In 
these three central features – purpose, audience, and organization – Reveries differs from 
Confessions.
35
 These two works belong to different categories; the confessional mode is 
widely recognized, and I believe the reverie mode should be as well.  
  
As I discuss the differences between Reveries of a Solitary Walker and 
Confessions, however, similarities between Reveries and Montaigne’s Essays will 
become apparent. Nevertheless, relevant differences separate the reverie mode from 
Essays. Although our primary concern will be with Montaigne’s influence on Reveries, 
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the Foreward to Confessions also invites comparison with Montaigne’s opening note “To 
the Reader”; so by way of introduction to Montaigne, we will begin with this note. 
Montaigne writes, 
I have dedicated [this book] to the private convenience of my relatives and 
friends, so that when they have lost me (as soon they must), they may recover 
here some features of my habits and temperament, and by this means keep the 
knowledge they have had of me more complete and alive. If my design had been 
to seek the favor of the world, I would have decked myself out better…. Here I 
want to be seen in my simple, natural, everyday fashion, without striving or 
artifice: for it is my own self that I am painting. Here, drawn from life, you will 
read of my defects and my native form so far as respect for social conventions 
allows.
36
 
 
This voice makes Rousseau’s seem like an echo; although Rousseau claims to undertake 
a unique project, it is unique only in degree and not in type. His plan to reveal both faults 
and virtues, both actions and more general components of his character, in order to create 
for others an accurate way to remember him, seems identical to Montaigne’s stated 
purpose. The only difference Rousseau claims is in the range of his audience. Rousseau 
addresses all current and future members of the public, while Montaigne targets “my 
relatives and friends.” Although Rousseau does not point out this difference himself, it is 
also clear that he is unwilling to be restrained by “social conventions.”  
 Following Montaigne’s opening note are three volumes’ worth of essays on a 
wide variety of topics with such diverse titles as “Our emotions get carried away beyond 
us,” “On the custom of wearing clothes,” “On smells,” and “Observations on Julius 
Caesar’s methods of waging war.” They cover Montaigne’s views on social, personal, 
experiential, historical, philosophical, literary, and religious matters. They vary in length 
and seriousness. Each one, however, has one or a few central ideas that the author hopes 
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to communicate to his readers by means of explanation and example. He weaves relevant 
information about his experiences, practices, and beliefs together with these ideas, but 
they, rather than he, receive primary attention. 
 The defining distinction between Rousseau’s Reveries and his Confessions and 
Montaigne’s Essays is Reveries’ tendency to highlight the speaker’s internal experience 
over his actions or impersonal ideas. Montaigne wanted to give his friends and family a 
means of remembering him after his death, and Rousseau in Confessions wanted to create 
a “monument of my character” that his opponents could not destroy. But in Reveries, 
Rousseau says that he writes not for current or future readers but for his future self. He 
hopes that as he ages, “reading [my reveries] will remind me of the pleasure I have in 
writing them and, by thus reviving the past for me…I shall live with myself in another 
age, as if living with a younger friend” (9). Comparing this statement and Montaigne’s 
and Rousseau’s about Essays and Confessions, respectively, reveals both Reveries’ 
connection to its two predecessors and the change that has occurred within Rousseau 
since writing Confessions. Cranston refers to Rousseau’s “turn[ing] his attention inward,” 
and Rousseau seems intent to block out any thoughts his relationship to society.
37
 Selvin 
argues that this is not merely a different writing style but evidence of a real psychological 
change;
38
 therefore, it colors his writing on the most basic level.  
While Rousseau’s inward shift captured in Reveries was real, it was not complete. 
That is, it is not entirely accurate to say that he became “concerned solely with myself" as 
he apparently intended to (Reveries 7). In the Seventh Walk, he claims to find the greatest 
pleasure when he can “forget myself” in reveries focused on the natural world (74). He 
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conducted extensive botanical studies during the years in which he wrote Reveries (1776-
78),
39
 studies that showed extended attention to plants’ physical structure and beauty. In 
the reverie mode of writing, however, he presents even that external focus in a way that 
makes it seem like a form of introspection: he describes his botany in terms of his 
motivations for undertaking it, the pleasure he finds in it, and its soothing effects on his 
mind. Although in actuality he spent a great deal of attention on the external world during 
that time, his record of botanical study in Reveries of a Solitary Walker reflects reverie 
mode’s focus on internal experiences. 
 This inward focus of Reveries of a Solitary Walker distinguishes it from 
Confessions and Essays. Each of Reveries’ ten essay-like sections, entitled “First Walk,” 
“Second Walk,” etc., contains a record of his thoughts during that walk, emphasizing the 
internal action of his thoughts, memories, and imagination, rather than external action or 
events. He alludes to or recounts past events, but only within larger musings about 
philosophical questions or about his own personal development. In the Fourth Walk, he 
references the incident with Marion, discussed earlier as presented in Confessions. A 
comparison between the two accounts reveals the differences of genre between 
Confessions and Reveries.  
When Rousseau relates the story of the stolen ribbon in Confessions, he carefully 
describes the actions, in order, of each person involved. He includes his own thought 
process (“She was present in my thoughts; I excused myself on the first object offered”) 
and emotional reactions (“my heart was racked”) as they correspond to the actions he 
describes (78). He explains the internal and external causes of the situation and describes 
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its effects on his memory and his conscience. Then he claims to have said all he has to 
say and that he wishes to speak of the incident no more. In Reveries, on the other hand, 
he alludes to the incident within the context of his reflections on the definition and 
morality of lying. He gives no detailed account of the theft and subsequent confrontation, 
but refers to the whole encounter as “an awful lie I had told when I was very young” (33). 
He does not even mention Marion’s name until he returns to the topic in a passing 
reference nine pages later (42). As in Confessions, he describes the “remorse” he 
experienced following his lie and calls the lie a “product of false shame,” carried out 
because of fear rather than malice (33). After a single paragraph, however, he moves on 
to describe the memory’s affects on him, which include “inspir[ing] in me a horror of 
lying” (34). He does not mention the event in order to present a complete account to an 
external audience, but because it was “the first thought that came to me as I started to 
reflect” on the topic of contemplation that he chose for his walk that day (33). All the 
details he includes relate to his own internal experience and are presented as they occur to 
him, without showing evidence of forethought regarding the order or extent of 
explanation. 
 The differences in the two accounts of his adolescent crime reflect differences 
present throughout the two works. Confessions presents an organized history of his life; 
Reveries presents an evolving record of current thoughts. Rousseau describes the latter as 
“a faithful record of my solitary walks and the reveries that fill them when I let my mind 
wander quite freely and my ideas follow their own course unhindered and untroubled” 
(11). The essays follow Rousseau’s train of thought; they have no other organizing 
principle. Recurring themes tie them together, but the essays could occur in any order 
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without altering the overall effect; they do not fit into a single unified structure. Within 
each Walk, one central theme often blends freely into other topics as one thought leads to 
another within Rousseau’s mind. This lack of organization, or rather, organization 
according to the narrator’s train of thought, is one defining characteristic of a reverie.   
 Again, the reader familiar with Montaigne’s Essays will see marked parallels with 
Reveries. I use the term “essay” to describe Rousseau’s Walks, because, used in a loose, 
non-specific sense, the term captures their form well. Both Rousseau’s Walks and 
Montaigne’s Essays are relatively short, non-narrative, non-informational40 sections, 
distinct from one another but not holding unique places in a larger, overarching structure. 
Furthermore, Montaigne names a similar connection between thought and writing that 
motivates Rousseau’s Reveries. In “On Idleness,” Montaigne recognizes the phenomenon 
that Rousseau demonstrates: when one separates oneself from society and allows one’s 
mind to wander wherever it will, it goes to strange, unpredictable places.
41
 Montaigne 
compares the unrestrained mind to a “runaway horse” and cautions that it is prone to fall 
into “madness” or “raving lunacy.” Curious though disapproving as to where his mind 
might go, he ends the essay, “so as to contemplate at my ease [my thoughts’] oddness and 
strangeness, I began to keep a record of them, hoping in time to make mind ashamed of 
itself.” Again, when compared to Montaigne’s statements about his own writing project, 
Rousseau’s sound like echoes.  
 Montaigne’s influence on Rousseau is also evident in Rousseau’s attitude towards 
his own thoughts. Both Montaigne and Rousseau are deeply affected by the use of their 
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imaginations. Montaigne writes that "I am one of those by whom the powerful blows of 
the imagination are felt most strongly. Everyone is hit by it, but some are bowled over.”42 
Similarly, Rousseau calls himself a “sensitive soul” and implies that his sensitivity makes 
him more prone to reveries than most (92). Rousseau’s opinion that the best consequence 
of his exile is his discovery that isolation is conducive to reflection and reverie also 
shows the influence of Montaigne’s perspective (24). Montaigne argued that it is right to 
separate oneself – sometimes physically and always emotionally – from commitments 
and relationships outside oneself in order to allow oneself to think.
43
 
 While the influence of Montaigne’s Essays on Rousseau’s Reveries of a Solitary 
Walker are undeniable, the genres remain distinct. Montaigne wrote in order to capture 
his ideas; Rousseau captures the process by which his ideas were formed. Reveries 
celebrates the author’s experience of day-dreaming and the pleasure it brings him; Essays 
skims briefly over the author’s experience to the content of his thoughts. Each essay leads 
the reader to a final conclusion; the Walks do not. These differences highlight the 
essential characteristics of the reverie genre.  
 
Similar distinctions separate Reveries of a Solitary Walker from the confessional 
mode. Rousseau’s new inward orientation affects each defining characteristic: its 
purpose, its audience, and its organization. Rousseau writes that in Reveries he will 
“resume the painstaking and sincere self-examination that I formerly called my 
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Confessions” (7). This seems to imply that both works take on the same task. The way the 
author goes about it in each work, however, differs. In Confessions, he confidently 
declares that “I know my heart” (3). Self-revelation, therefore, comes as a straightforward 
step of communicating the truths he knows about himself. Ten additional years of life, 
however, weakened Rousseau’s confidence in his self-knowledge and showed him that 
some of his motives and internal characteristics remained hidden even from himself. At 
the beginning of his Fourth Walk, he writes that he has concluded that “the Know Thyself 
of the Temple at Delphi was not such an easy maxim to follow as I had believed in my 
Confessions” (33). He repeats this sentiment in the Sixth Walk, where he says, “the real 
and essential motives of most of my actions are not as clear to me as I had for a long time 
imagined them to be” (60). This search for a deeper understanding of his motives takes 
place within a larger endeavor to understand his own character and the way it has 
changed over time. This purpose contrasts with that of Confession, where he intended to 
give the public an accurate and complete image of himself, of which he believed himself 
to be in possession.
44
 In Reveries, he turns inward to make his own image of himself 
more accurate and complete.  
Again, Rousseau’s statement of purpose in Reveries somewhat mirrors 
Montaigne’s, which communicates curiosity about where his thoughts would go if they 
wandered undirected and his desire to record what he discovered. The underlying attitude 
towards his thoughts and towards himself, however, differs. Montaigne recorded his 
thoughts “hoping in time to make mind ashamed of itself” for wandering in such strange 
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ways.
45
 He values orderliness, restraint, and reason. Throughout his essays, he presents 
himself according to those principles; he seems comfortable with his identity and calmly 
explains his thoughts. Rousseau, on the other hand, overtly cherishes the wild 
unpredictability of his imagination. A pulse of discontentment with many parts of his life 
characterizes Rousseau of the Reveries, but letting his mind wander freely seems to 
always bring him joy. That is one reason for calling this genre the reverie genre, because 
it celebrates reveries.  
Rousseau lacks Montaigne’s self-composure, however, and carries out his “self-
examination” with a tone of yearning for resolution. As in Confessions, he keeps his sight 
set on his goal of gaining a deeper understanding of himself, as though it could fill some 
of the emptiness in his soul. In the Seventh Walk, he describes his new interest in botany. 
After giving several reasons for his attraction to the study of plants, he complains that 
these explanations, though he fully believes them, 
[do] not tell me why this inclination attracts me nor what charm I can find in a 
fruitless study which I pursue without learning anything useful…. Now, this is a 
bizarre thing that I would like to explain to myself; it seems to me that, once fully 
explained, it could cast some new light on the self-knowledge which I have 
devoted my final days of leisure to acquiring. (70) 
 
He has a rational explanation for his interest in plants, but it does not satisfy him. He 
confesses a deeper uncertainty about his attraction to it, as though it points to a larger 
portion of his inner desires that he does not yet understand. Neither Montaigne nor 
Rousseau in Confessions acknowledges a lingering, unsettling uncertainty about one’s 
ability to understand oneself; this tension characterizes the reverie writers. 
 The narrators of Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground and Eliot’s “The Love 
Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” the other two works that I argue form part of the reverie 
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genre, share Rousseau’s uncertain, self-questioning attitude. The Underground Man, 
Dostoevsky’s narrator, bursts out in the middle of his tirade about the strange enjoyment 
he finds in his own degradation and hopelessness, “But enough. Bah, I have talked a lot 
of nonsense, but what have I explained? Can this enjoyment be explained? But I will 
explain it! I will get to the bottom of it! That is why I have taken up my pen” (Notes from 
Underground 8). He is frustrated at his own emotions and hopes that writing will help 
him make sense of the chaos inside him. Prufrock, Eliot’s narrator, begins the poem with 
a dilemma about whether to visit a certain social gathering, but by the end he is lost in 
questioning about his own identity.  
 
 We have seen that one purpose of reverie writing is to facilitate the writer’s 
process of improving his understanding of himself. Another related but less overt purpose 
in writing a reverie is justify oneself in one’s own eyes. In Confessions, Rousseau 
intended to vindicate himself before the public, and at first glance Reveries may seem to 
aim at the same goal. The tone of self-justification lingers, and occasionally he slips into 
full self-defense. For example, after blaming others for losing the character qualities 
which originally attracted his love, he acknowledges that perhaps he too has changed 
more than he should. He adds, though, “What sort of character could withstand a 
situation like mine without changing?” (Reveries 64).  Even when he does so, however, 
he seems to be trying to convince himself that he is right. The evidence he uses to argue 
that he is not at fault for losing the joy he used to find in doing good for others is based 
on his internal experiences and would not be particularly convincing to a skeptical reader. 
After saying that he has found that even his attempts to do good often result in harm, he 
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says this to comfort himself: “I know that, whatever the effect of my good deed may be, I 
will still be able to take credit for my good intention” (64). He attempts to confirm that he 
is right on the basis of something of which he feels confident – his “good intention” – but 
gives no externally visible evidence of that good intention. If his primary goal in Reveries 
is to reconcile himself to himself, however, rather than earn the approval of his readers, 
he has no need to confirm his good intention through external evidence, because he is 
already convinced of his good intentions – or so he claims. Recall that earlier in the Sixth 
Walk, however, he questions the extent to which he truly knows his own motives. Then, 
he begins an internal discussion of the nature of his natural inclinations and the reasons 
for which he does not always follow them. In this context, his statement that “I know…I 
will still be able to take credit for my good intention” seems to state the degree of 
certainty that he wishes he had rather than that he actually has. If he were truly convinced 
of the purity of his motives, he would treat that as an assumption on which to base further 
conclusions, rather than a statement to be explicitly affirmed and repeated. So both the 
evidence he uses to confirm that statement and the fact that he feels the need to state it at 
all point to the self-directed nature of his self-justification in Reveries.  
  
Since Rousseau has turned inward since writing Confessions, it makes sense that 
his intended audience has shifted as well. As he introduces his writing project in the First 
Walk, he compares it explicitly to Montaigne’s Essays, saying, “My task is the same as 
that of Montaigne, but my aim is the exact opposite of his: for he wrote his essays 
entirely for others, whereas I am writing my reveries entirely for myself” (9). Rousseau 
may exaggerate to say that Montaigne had no self-interest in writing Essays; if nothing 
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else, Montaigne expressed curiosity at seeing where his mind would go if he let it run 
freely. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s point stands: Montaigne explicitly addresses his Essays 
to external readers, just as Rousseau himself had done in Confessions. Reflecting his 
different goals in writing Reveries, Rousseau claims that his only audience is himself. 
Some of Reveries’ content, however, gives us reason to doubt whether he truly 
intended for no one but himself to read them. He repeatedly and bitterly refers to his 
persecution and rejection by society. Although these references occur in the third person 
rather than the second, they are so numerous and their tone so vindictive or resentful that 
one must wonder whether he does not secretly hope that they will read what he has 
written about them. For example, his opening paragraph states,  
The most sociable and loving of human beings has by common consent been 
banished by the rest of society. In the refinement of their hatred they have 
continued to seek out the cruelest forms of torture for my sensitive soul, and they 
have brutally severed all ties which bound me to them. I would have loved my 
fellow men in spite of themselves. Only by ceasing to be men have they 
succeeded in losing my affection for them. (3) 
 
This opening passage seethes with accusation. Vindicating himself, he places all blame 
on “the rest of society” for rejecting him, isolating him, ceasing to merit his love, and 
even “ceasing to be men.” It is possible that this passage simply constitutes the 
expression of pent-up emotion, but the frequency with which he accuses those who 
banished him, as well as his tone, indicate that although he refuses to address his readers 
directly, he hopes to be “overheard,” as Gossman says.46 Notes from Underground and 
“The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” contain similar conflicts between their stated 
audience and the implied readership. So while critics may reach different conclusions 
about whether Rousseau, as well as Prufrock and the Underground Man, truly intend to 
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write for others or only for themselves, the ambiguity of audience distinguishes these 
works from Confessions and Essays and marks one of the defining characteristics of the 
reverie genre. 
Finally, Reveries differs from Confessions in terms of organization. Given 
Reveries’ purpose, audience, and emphasis on the author’s internal experiences of 
thought and imagination, each Walk is organized simply according the progression of his 
thoughts. That is, they do not seem organized at all. This free-flowing structure stands in 
contrast to Confessions, which proceeds in strictly chronological order. In this respect 
Rousseau seems to imitate Montaigne, who intended to record his wildly wandering 
thoughts.
47
 Rousseau writes in Reveries that he will create “a shapeless account of my 
reveries,” where “I shall say what I have thought just as it came to me” (8). Both Essays 
and Reveries have a meandering, unpredictable quality, but each individual Walk seems 
more convincingly unplanned and truly in the same form as the thoughts originally 
appeared than the essays do. The reader can identify themes and topics in each Walk, but 
the walk itself seems not to have any definite beginning or end, but rather to represent an 
excerpt from an ongoing thought process. Each essay, however, is united by a central 
idea or message. Tangents, anecdotes, and subordinate ideas are woven into the mixture, 
but by the end of each essay, Montaigne has presented his readers with a conclusion or 
moral. The path to that conclusion may meander, but upon reaching the conclusion the 
reader can see the connection between earlier components of the essay. Reveries lack this 
appearance of having been reshaped to lead readers to a chosen idea. 
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 Reveries of a Solitary Walker, therefore, differs significantly enough from 
Confessions and Essays that it merits in own generic title: the reverie. Confessions itself 
broke many literary conventions associated with the genre of a confession,
48
 and some 
consider it the first true autobiography.
49
 Rousseau himself considered it unique. He 
introduces it as “hitherto without precedent” and is confident that it “will never have an 
imitator” (Confessions 3). Reveries takes one step further from literary conventions by 
shifting from a focus on the author’s life events and the development of his character to 
his subjectivity, taking the processes of thought, memory, and imagination, and not only 
their contents, as its subject.
50
 The emphasis on the self and the imagination characteristic 
of the Romantic movement in literature, of which Rousseau was a prominent figure. The 
reverie is intended to benefit the writer rather than the reader and in fact denies the 
existence of any reader other than the writer. It expresses the author’s uncertainty about 
his own identity and his self-knowledge and endeavors to increase the accuracy of his 
understanding of himself. Furthermore, the process of writing facilitates the use of his 
imagination,
51
 preserves pleasant memories for future enjoyment (Reveries 8), and 
distracts him from his pain. He claims to find positive “pleasure of conversing with my 
soul,” but also engages in reveries because “the habit of turning in on myself eventually 
made me insensible to my suffering, and almost made me forget it altogether” (7, 11).  
Yet letting his mind roam entirely unrestrained also brings him suffering, because 
his mind sometimes turns outward instead of inward, remembering his rejection by 
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former friends as well as opponents and dwelling on his isolation. Although he claims to 
have found a “sufficient, perfect, and full happiness” in reveries (55), a tone of sadness 
nonetheless persists and even grows over the course of Reveries whenever Rousseau talks 
about his separation from society. So he finds his reveries worthy of celebration but 
insufficient to produce true peace. 
  
Hyperconscious Dreamers: Rousseau, the Underground Man, and Prufrock 
  Rousseau’s self-doubt exemplifies not only a personal characteristic but a feature 
of the reverie mode. Surprising similarities among the narrators of Reveries of a Solitary 
Walker, Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, and Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock” point to the necessity of studying them in relation to one another. As 
represented in these reveries, each narrator experiences variations of what the 
Underground Man calls “hyperconsciousness.” This takes multiple forms, which I divide 
into two categories. The first, hyperconsciousness, is a heightened awareness of 
something outside oneself, such as human nature or principles that govern the universe. 
Hyper-self-consciousness, on the other hand, entails an inward focus; it come in the form 
of intense introspection, fear of one’s appearance before others, and self-absorption that 
squelches one’s ability to see life from another’s perspective.52 Each form of 
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hyperconsciousness or hyper-self-consciousness leads to some type of inability to or lack 
of desire to act, resulting in paralysis of the will.  
Rousseau first reveals hyper-self-consciousness in a way we have already 
mentioned: he speaks with authorial self-awareness in Reveries by commenting explicitly 
on the nature and purpose of his writing project. In his First Walk, for example, he says, 
“These pages will in fact be merely a shapeless account of my reveries. They will often 
be about me, because a reflective solitary man necessarily thinks about himself a lot” (8). 
Juliet Maccannell identifies similar meta-writing in Preface to Narcissus and 
Confessions, where Rousseau likewise uses no narrative mask but speaks directly to his 
audience and, in Preface to Narcissus, even defends his earlier writings.53 Rousseau 
writes as the author, not a created narrator within the written work and confined to the 
imagined world.  
Dostoevsky parodies this authorial self-awareness. The Underground Man 
describes his “notes” almost identically to the way Rousseau describes Reveries. 
Rousseau wrote that he would create “a shapeless account of my reveries…[and] all the 
strange ideas which come into my head as I walk” (8). The Underground Man imitates 
him: “I don’t wish to be hampered by any restrictions in compiling my notes. I shall not 
attempt any system or method. I will jot down things as I remember them” (Notes 37). 
The Underground Man explicitly describes his plan for his writing project, just as 
Rousseau did. He identifies its intended form – unrestricted, lacking system or method, 
just as Rousseau’s was “shapeless.” They share the same organizing principle: none 
except the order in which thoughts appear in the writer’s mind. They take the same 
central subject: the author himself. Rousseau predicts that his thoughts and therefore his 
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writings will “often be about me,” and the Underground Man echoes in a comment 
disjointed from its preceding introduction to himself and his life circumstances, 
“incidentally, what can a decent man speak about with the greatest pleasure? Answer: 
about himself. Well, then, I will talk about myself” (6). Finally, they claim the same 
audience; in this parallel, Dostoevsky gives his narrator more extensive and ironic satire. 
Rousseau claimed to write “entirely for myself.” The Underground Man, like Rousseau, 
compares his writing to a confession made to the public – Rousseau’s, in fact, just as 
Rousseau compared his to Montaigne’s. Following this comparison to Confessions, the 
Underground Man adds, “I, however, am writing for myself, and wish to declare once 
and for all that if I write as though I were addressing readers, that is simply because it is 
easier for me to write in that way. …I shall never have readers. I have made this plain 
already” (37). The extent to which he elaborates on this point after having spent the entire 
first section addressing the “gentlemen,” anticipating their questions and criticisms and 
even dedicating paragraphs to what he believes they will say, indicates that he does not 
expect to be taken seriously. This is satire. And he continues:  
But here, perhaps, someone will take me at my word and ask me: if you really 
don’t count on readers, why do you make such compacts with yourself – and on 
paper too – that is, that you won’t attempt any system or method, that you will jot 
things down as you remember them, etc., etc? Why do you keep explaining? Why 
do you keep apologizing? (37) 
 
Saying that “perhaps, someone will take me at my word” (emphasis added) indicates that 
in general he does not expect to be taken at his word. He is an exaggerator and expects 
others to be aware of this. That the Underground Man does not expect others to take him 
seriously reflects Dostoevksy’s view of Rousseau,54 also an exaggerator, whom 
Dostoevsky seems to imply is not considered entirely trustworthy. Rousseau may not 
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have been as aware of this situation as the Underground Man was, however. The 
Underground Man’s questions could be directed at Rousseau, like a retrospective attempt 
to make him understand how others perceive him. The Underground Man does not 
borrow Rousseau’s exact words, but his choice to “jot things down as [I] remember 
them” and rejection of “any system or method” applies equally to Rousseau. Throughout 
his essays, Rousseau consistently “explains” his reasons for holding certain beliefs or 
taking certain actions. Apologizing, on the other hand, does not have an obvious 
antecedent in Rousseau’s writing, for Rousseau repeatedly affirms his confidence in his 
own innocence and purity.  
 The Underground Man gives a few answers to these questions (which are at least 
superficially directed at himself) before presenting another objection to the claim that one 
could write purely for oneself. He challenges himself, “What precisely is my object in 
writing? If it is not for the public, then after all, why should I not simply recall these 
incidents in my own mind without putting them down on paper?” (37). His answers 
satirize Rousseau even more than the questions did. In answer to the first set of questions, 
he gives this reason: “I am simply a coward.” No explanation follows, but the answer 
seems consistent with Dostoevsky’s view of Rousseau.55  
In answer to his question about his reason for recording his thoughts at all, he 
responds, “I purposely imagine an audience before me in order to conduct myself in a 
more dignified manner” (37). A paragraph later, he repeats, “somehow it is more 
dignified on paper. There is something more impressive in it.” These answers give two 
veiled criticisms of Rousseau. First, if the Underground Man himself perceives the need 
to act “in a more dignified manner,” he must on most occasions, or at least when he is 
                                                 
55
 Miller, Dostoevsky’s Unfinished Journey, 87. 
 38 
alone, not act in a sufficiently dignified manner. Perhaps Dostoevsky wishes to call to the 
reader’s mind Rousseau’s strange paranoia of others plotting against him. Towards the 
end of his life, having experienced some real persecution and imagined much more, 
Rousseau frequently assumed malicious intentions where none existed and responded 
irrationally to perceived threats.56 Perhaps Dostoevsky considered Rousseau’s desperate 
attempts to regain public approval, his expression of strange ideas, or his decision to 
dress in Armenian clothing undignified. In any case, it is an unflattering stab at Rousseau. 
Second, these two answers allude to Rousseau’s artificially high self-esteem and deep 
commitment to his own honor in that he is concerned even with dignity in his own eyes. 
This concern reveals his uncertainty with his own identity, as discussed earlier. If he had 
full confidence in his own honorability, he would not need to work so consciously to 
maintain it. These allusion and responses Notes confirm Dostoevsky’s awareness of and 
opposition to Rousseau and his works. He never mentions Reveries explicitly the way he 
mentions Confessions; but these and other parallels, to be discussed in the following 
chapter, strongly imply his awareness of the work. But even if he truly had not read 
Reveries, the similarities between the two works would become even more striking and 
even more directly attributable to the genre itself.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
Rousseau’s self-awareness is not limited to his narrative voice within the written 
text; he also purposely analyzes himself in order to reach a more accurate understanding 
of his own character and motivations. This was one of his originally-stated purposes in 
beginning this writing project; in his First Walk, he says that “I am devoting my last days 
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to studying myself” and to “painstaking and sincere self-examination” (7). Specifically, 
in the Sixth Walk, for example, he notices that he often walks along a certain roundabout 
path and “sought in myself the reason why” (59). Upon discovering the reason,57 he 
realizes that in many cases “the real and essential motives of most of my actions were not 
as clear to as I had for a long time imagined them to be” (60) and begins a more thorough 
process of self-contemplation that, among other things, “alters considerably the opinion 
that I for a long time had of my own virtue” (61). Rousseau’s continual self-analysis 
constitutes one form of hyper-self-consciousness that distinguishes the reverie writer 
from the writer of a confession or an essay, who recall and recount but do not gain 
additional insight through the process of writing. 
 
The comments that demonstrate Rousseau’s authorial self-consciousness also 
allude to the other two forms of his hyper-self-consciousness and hyperconsciousness. 
First, he shows excessive concern for other people’s opinions of him. He fears their 
criticism, and disapproval both crushes his spirit and sparks expressions of prideful 
indignance. This is an excessive form of self-consciousness. Second, Rousseau’s 
paranoia, mentioned above, could be considered hyper-sensitivity to details of events and 
of people’s words and actions, which he interprets as composing a secret plots against 
him. The term hyperconsciousness does not fit this phenomenon exactly, however, 
because “consciousness” implies an awareness of something that actually exists; the 
conspiracies that Rousseau believes exist against him are the products only of his own 
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imagination. This too, has parallels in the ways the Underground Man and Prufrock 
interpret their interactions with other people. 
Some of Rousseau’s fear of criticism and rejection finds reasonable cause in his 
experiences. He had earned literary fame through many of his early writings, and 
Maurice Cranston describes him as not only a “literary celebrity” but a “cult figure” by 
1761, following the publication of Julie.58 As his writings became more controversial, 
however, many fellow philosophers or supporters whom Rousseau considered his friends 
began to turn away from him. Frederick Grimm began to circulate criticism of Rousseau 
in his uncensored newsletter, some aimed at the ideas Rousseau presented and some at 
Rousseau himself.59 Voltaire joined him in publishing personal attacks.60 His Discourse 
of the Origins of Inequality, published in 1755, had sparked strong opposition, receiving 
criticism for godlessness, giving an unfavorable representation of humans and 
undercutting the legitimacy of owning property.61 Opposition from those who usually 
disagreed with him did not disturb him as much as the increased rejection by his 
friends:62 Mme. D’Epinay, hostess of a salon he had attended and a former supporter, 
worked together with Grimm and Denis Diderot to compose an epistolary novel 
presenting an intentionally false and damaging image of Rousseau.63 In 1762, state 
opposition was added to Rousseau’s social and literary rejection to solidify his isolation 
when the Paris parlement ordered Emile to be burned and issued an arrest warrant for 
Rousseau. Geneva, to which Rousseau initially fled, reached the same conclusion 
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although for different reasons; both Emile and Social Contract were censored and burned, 
and Rousseau exiled on pains of being arrested and tried if he ever entered the city 
again.64  
 We have already seen that Rousseau opens his First Walk with a complaint about 
having “by common consent been banished by the rest of society” (Reveries 3). He calls 
that banishment “the cruelest forms of torture for my sensitive soul.” This summary 
leaves out his contributions to the process of severing ties but reveals the extent to which 
he values and craves people’s support and approval by the distress their rejection causes 
him. He continues, “they have heaped upon me insults, disparagement, mockery, and 
shame, but these are no more capable of being increased than of being relieved; they are 
as incapable of making them any worse as I am of escaping them” (4). But he explains 
that by piling as much opposition onto him as possible, so that it is “[in]capable of being 
increased,” they have actually given him a way to find peace. If he ever hoped to regain 
their favor, he explains, he would live in constant “fear and…the anxiety of hope” (5); 
but by giving him reason to believe that they will never accept him back, they have 
taught him to choose resignation and freed him, supposedly, from his endless search for 
their approval. In order to find peace without social acceptance, however, Rousseau must 
entirely shift his values. The drastic conditions required to make him give up his quest for 
acceptance reveal the depth with which that desire is ingrained in his heart.  
 The Underground Man and Prufrock suffer from this same unhealthy dependence 
on others’ opinions. Prufrock’s poem revolves around his dilemma about whether to visit 
a woman in whom he is romantically interested. Fear of others’ responses to an 
unexpected, improper, and perhaps unrequited expression of his emotion inhibits him, 
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however. His thoughts about what he will wear and say are interrupted by this terrifying, 
paralyzing speculation: “[They will say: ‘How his hair is growing thin!’] / My morning 
coat, my collar mounting firmly to the chin, / My necktie rich and modest, but asserted by 
a simple pin – / [They will say: ‘But how his arms and legs are thin!’] / Do I dare / 
Disturb the universe?”65 The responses he imagines from the other socialites destroys his 
confidence. Although he compiles a proper outfit and describes it as “firm,” “rich and 
modest,” and “simple,” implying strength and propriety, his attempts to present himself 
acceptably are just as unsuccessful as Rousseau’s attempts to repair his damaged image. 
In his imagined scenario, others pay no attention to Prufrock’s clothes, commenting 
instead on his growing baldness (41) and “thin” limbs (44). He tries to portray 
respectability and confidence, but they see weakness and loss of youthfulness and 
attractiveness. Prufrock’s inability to win approval from others even in his imagination 
mirrors Rousseau’s rejection, as does the corresponding fear. Just as Rousseau chooses to 
resign himself to withdrawing from society, Prufrock too responds to the imagined 
criticism with the cry of uncertainty, “Do I dare / disturb the universe?” that indicates 
crushed confidence and withdrawal from the idea of attending the social gathering. 
 The Underground Man, too, fears people’s rejection. At the beginning of Part II, 
when he introduces himself as of twenty years prior to Part I, he writes,  
My life was even then gloomy, disorganized, and solitary to the point of savagery. 
I made friends with no one and even avoided talking, and hid myself in my corner 
more and more. At work in my office I even tried never to look at anyone, and I 
was very well aware that my colleagues looked on me…with a sort of loathing. 
(39) 
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His confidence that others “looked on [him]…with a sort of loathing” eliminates his 
interpersonal interactions with his co-workers as much as possible. Their apparent 
disapproval prevents him from trying to “[make] friends,” moving about freely in the 
office, speaking, or even make eye contact. He does not fear doing something that will 
cause others’ disapproval as much as he is certain that others already disapprove of him 
and therefore refrains from interacting with them as much as possible. Describing his lack 
of confidence in the office, the Underground Man realizes, as he considers men with ugly 
faces or smelly uniforms who do not seem nearly as fearful as he is, that “I very often 
looked at myself with furious discontent, which verged on loathing, and so I inwardly 
attributed the same view to everyone" (40). The Underground Man’s awareness of his 
self-disdain allows him to understand that he has no basis for assuming that others that 
others “loathe” him except that he loathes himself. He imagines that others must see him 
the way he sees himself, projecting his own opinions onto others. Similarly, although he 
is drawn to Liza, claims to have had “real feeling” for her (102) and momentarily forgets 
himself long enough to offer to help her (97), he ultimately resists actually beginning a 
relationship because he fears being seen as weak and poor (102). He imagines that if she 
came, she would primarily notice poverty and dishonor,
66
 and he fears and hates her 
because of what he imagines she will think rather than because of anything she has 
actually done.  
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 If projecting one’s self-perception onto others leads to excessive sensitivity to 
opinions that may not truly exist, all three of our narrators experience this false 
hyperconsciosuness. Rousseau, however, takes it to an extreme. The Underground Man 
imagines little more than others’ attitudes towards him; Rousseau believes that all of 
society is conspiring in a secret plot against him. After witnessing public responses to a 
rumor of his death, described in the Second Walk, he concludes that a “general 
conspiracy” must be forming against him (Reveries 19). In fact, he believes that not only 
all mankind but “Heaven” too stands opposed to him, because he finds the “universal 
consensus…too extraordinary to be purely coincidental” and too successful to be 
accomplished only by “wicked men.” The details of the conspiracy are not clear from the 
Reveries but biographers provide more specific accounts. One of the more tragic 
examples of Rousseau’s paranoia and its consequences comes form his conflict with 
David Hume, who generously allowed Rousseau to live with him in England after 
Rousseau’s exile from Paris and Geneva. Rousseau’s suspicions began, not without some 
reason, when he found that Hume often opened his mail and had inquired into his 
financial affairs. Hume intended to prevent unwanted communication from the mainland 
and to acquire more patronage for Rousseau, but Rousseau interpreted these actions as 
invasions of privacy.
67
 As his fear grew, however, Rousseau began to draw strange 
conclusions from less suspicious activities. When he misattributed a mocking letter to 
Jean le Rond d’Alembert and Hume confirmed Horace Walpole had indeed written it, 
Rousseau concluded that all three men must be plotting against him.
68
 Then he began to 
interpret Hume’s tendency to stare blankly into the distance and his lack of emotional 
                                                 
67
 Damrosch, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 418-19. 
68
 Ibid. 420-21. 
 45 
expressiveness as “insidious” and indicative of malicious intent.69 Rousseau eventually 
left Hume’s household; their mutual trust was destroyed.  
 Rousseau’s propensity to draw false conclusions from relatively minor actions 
forms another sort of hyperconsicousness. This hyperconsciousness differs from the other 
two sorts of self-consciousness (self-referencing comments by the author about his own 
writing and self-analysis, discussed in the previous two sections) in that he is not the 
explicit object of his attention. His paranoia motivates him to observe others’ actions and 
to draw conclusion from them. Nevertheless, this hyper-consciousness reveals a deep 
self-centeredness in that it depends on the belief that the every member of society whom 
he imagines to be complicit in the plot is both deeply aware of him and feel strongly 
enough about him to put considerable effort into forming this plot. The conviction that 
everything and everyone opposes oneself is only a negative variation of the belief that all 
of life revolves around oneself. 
 Notice that Rousseau’s paranoia comes from his tendency to let his mind wander 
freely, without reason’s restraint. The reveries he celebrates in Reveries result in joyful 
calm; but his irrational fears also result from reveries. So his paranoia confirms his 
contemporaries’ fears that reveries would lead to false beliefs about reality.70 
 
Cycles of Isolation 
Each form of self-consciousness or hyperconsciousness produces its own form of 
inaction. Inaction in turn results in a form of isolation. Given his view of human nature as 
most pure when separated from society’s influence, as well as the emotional exhaustion 
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that must result from his persistent and irrational fear, Rousseau finds this isolation 
comforting to some extent. Rousseau’s inaction, isolation, and responses to both reveal 
the effects of reveries on his life and character.  
 Rousseau’s conviction that a plot existed against him caused him to withdraw 
from society as much as possible. He writes of this tendency to refrain from interacting 
with people in the Sixth Walk: he says that those who “control my fate” have so carefully 
crafted his circumstances that every apparent opportunity to do something beneficial only 
hides “a trap laid for me” with an inevitably “harmful” result (Reveries 64). Because of 
his belief, he says, “I refrain from acting at all…. No doubt I go too far, because I avoid 
any opportunity to act, even when I see that only good can be done.” He explains that he 
resists taking action because “I am sure that I am not being allowed to see things as they 
really are.” His paranoia directly causes his inaction. It also provided justification, at least 
in his own eyes, for severing relationships and blaming others for his situation. Damrosch 
writes about Rousseau’s explanation of his missing letters71 that “this bizarre 
story…explained his feeling of undeserved and perpetual isolation, and it gave him a way 
to project his gnawing sense of guilt onto agents outside himself, with a…sense of loss, 
grief, and undeserved suffering.”72 So Rousseau’s paranoia not only prevents him from 
interacting with other people but solidifies his condition of isolation by convincing him 
that he has no reason to want to reconnect with those who caused his suffering. 
 His hyper-self-consciousness leading to self-absorption and his desire to end all 
involvement in society also leads to inaction in that he believes himself to be free from all 
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social responsibility.
73
 Blaming his isolation on society, he practices isolation by turning 
not only his actions but his thoughts inward on himself. There are no traces of 
Confessions’ social orientation; in Reveries he asserts that “it is now my duty and desire 
to be concerned only with myself” (7). This commitment to accept no duty outside 
himself would not necessarily require separation from society and withdrawal from 
productive work, but in Rousseau’s case it does. He admits that all his interesting activity 
is now internal, saying, “my body has nothing to do, [but] my soul remains active, still 
producing feelings and thoughts, and its inner moral life seems even to have increased 
with the death of all earthly and temporal interests” (8). So we see that reveries create 
more reveries: paranoia makes him fear personal connections, and lacking these, he 
denies any responsibility to other people. Without relational duties, he easily justifies his 
inward focus and contents himself with activity of the soul and not of the body.  
 Rousseau’s focus on contemplation and self-analysis further motivate him to seek 
isolation in order to avoid distraction. Again echoing Montaigne, Rousseau writes that 
“the work that I was undertaking could only be accomplished in absolute isolation; it 
called for the kind of long and undisturbed meditations that the tumult of society does not 
allow” (24). This desire for solitude shows Montaigne’s influence on his perspective; in 
“On Solitude,” Montaigne taught that solitude is the proper context for self-
contemplation.
74
 In order to find “absolute isolation,” even on the solitary Ile de St. 
Pierre, he liked to row out into the middle of the lake and float there in a boat, or to find a 
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spot in the woods to sit and think (52,54). Walking, thinking, and studying nature become 
his primary occupations as he prioritizes reveries over all other people and actions.  
 
Evaluating the Reverie-Filled Life 
 Rousseau does not consider inactivity itself to be a problem, however. It 
facilitates his reveries, and isolation caters to his bitterness towards those who rejected 
him. Rousseau claims also to enjoy the isolation necessary for his meditation and which 
originally prompted him to begin Reveries of a Solitary Walker. He describes himself as a 
“solitary contemplative who love[s] to lose [himself] altogether in the charms of nature 
and to meditate in a silence unbroken by any sound other than that of” birds and running 
water (49). In addition to the fact that reverie requires solitude, which would likely be 
enough of a reason for Rousseau to love it, he also believes that his very nature includes a 
desire for solitude. As he begins the Fifth Walk, which describes part of his cherished 
time on the Island of St. Pierre, hr calls the island “wonderfully situated for the happiness 
of a man who likes to live within defined limits,” and refers to his “natural inclination” to 
live in such a small area. He wishes he could have stayed forever on the island where he 
could lose contact with “the mainland” and “[live] in a way so compatible with my 
nature” (50). This desire to live among plants and animals rather than people also reflects 
his belief that man is pure in solitude but corrupted in society.75 
 In Rousseau’s references to his isolation, however, it is impossible to miss the 
tone of sadness, loss, and sometimes bitterness that accompany them. On a small scale, 
on any individual day, he genuinely does seem to enjoy periods of solitude. But on a 
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larger scale, Rousseau’s political exile, social rejection, and severing of many personal 
ties understandably produce painful emotions. As mentioned earlier, Rousseau calls self-
contemplation “the only pleasure that my fellow men cannot take away from me” (7); 
while he affirms this pleasure’s sufficiency, he also implies that men have taken away 
every other pleasure – primarily that of benevolent society. The first sentence of Reveries 
expresses the pain he feels at his isolation: “So here I am, all alone on this earth, with no 
brother, neighbour, or friend, and no company but my own. …In the refinement of their 
hatred they have continued to seek out the cruelest forms of torture for my sensitive soul, 
and they have brutally severed all the ties which bound me to them” (3). Earlier, we 
discussed this passage as evidence of Rousseau’s dependence on others’ acceptance for 
his confidence and identity, a form of hyper-self-consciousness. On a simpler level, 
however, it simply indicates his understandable sense of loss and sadness. In the Ninth 
Walk, as he nears the end of his life, he gives a more open expression of his loneliness. 
He exclaims, “Oh, if I could still enjoy a few moments of pure, heartfelt affection…if I 
could still see in people’s eyes the joy and satisfaction of being with me…I would no 
longer be obliged to seek among animals the kind looks that I am now refused by human 
beings” (97-98). His early Walks affirmed the sufficient joy he found in exercising his 
imagination; after his imaginative power began to fade, he turned to the study and 
enjoyment of nature (75-77). By the Ninth Walk, however, Rousseau acknowledges, as 
one would expect, that animal and plant kingdoms cannot satisfy his soul’s desires.  
 
 Although they eventually let him down, Rousseau’s reveries receive stronger 
praise than any other source of happiness he finds. His reveries come in many forms. We 
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have discussed “the pleasure of conversing with my soul,” or focused introspection, and 
he affirms that “it is only in myself that I find solace, hope, and peace” (7). In the Fifth 
Walk, he describes a more passive version of reverie, in which he simply clears his mind 
and allows his physical surroundings to make impressions on it. He writes that as he sits 
by the edge of the water, 
the sound of the waves and the movement of the water, gripping my senses and 
ridding my soul of all other agitation, plunged it into a delicious reverie…. The 
ebb and flow of the water and its continuous yet constantly varying sound, ever 
breaking against my ears and my eyes, took the place of the movements inside me 
that reverie did away with and were enough to make me pleasantly aware of my 
existence, without having to take the trouble to think. From time to time there 
came to mind some slight and brief reflection on the instability of this world, the 
image of which I saw in the surface of the water: but soon these fragile 
impressions faded away… (54).  
 
In this state of reverie, the ideas that occur to him from his observations of his 
surroundings mirror ideas that he already had, namely, “the instability of this world.” 
This is another example of his tendency to interpret his surroundings as reflections of his 
interior state. In this case, however, he distinguishes between thought and awareness; he 
experiences a state of consciousness that allows him to receive impressions but requires 
no internal initiative. Later in the Fifth Walk, he describes still another state, in which he 
seems even less attentive to his surroundings. He claims that one who can lose all 
awareness of time, of “deprivation or enjoyment, pleasure or pain, desire or fear” and 
perceive only “our existence” has found “a sufficient, perfect, and full happiness, which 
leaves in the soul no void needing to be filled” (55). It seems that in this celebrated state 
of reverie, not even the waves’ motion would capture his attention.  
 The reverie genre is partially characterized by this emphasis on mental states. In 
this it differs from Confessions, which primarily highlights the author’s life and character, 
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and from Montaigne’s Essays, which focuses on the author’s ideas. Reveries of a Solitary 
Walker captures the variety of mental processes that compose Rousseau’s internal 
activity, including active self-analysis, as in the Sixth Walk, contemplation of 
philosophical topics such as the nature and value of lying in the Fourth Walk, passive 
states of impressionability approaching unconsciousness, and truly subconscious 
processes of which Rousseau was at least temporarily unaware (such as his habit of 
choosing a certain road in order to avoid a beggar). A century before Freud’s work on the 
subconscious, Reveries offers uncommon insight into the levels of consciousness that 
exist within one mind. This is one contribution of the reverie genre. It is not stream of 
consciousness technique, which attempts to express even sub-linguistic mental processes 
in language.76 By describing the existence of varying levels of consciousness and using 
language to follow the author’s flow of thoughts, however, Reveries of a Solitary Walker 
serves as a predecessor to stream of consciousness writing. 
 
                                                 
76
 I am borrowing Lawrence Bowling’s definition of the stream of consciousness technique, which will be 
more fully discussed in Chapter 3. Lawrence Bowling, “What is the Stream of Consciousness Technique?” 
PMLA: 64:5 (June 1950), 341. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Reverie Corrupted: Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground 
 
 
When Dostoevsky returned from exile in Siberia to St. Petersburg in 1860, he 
returned to a culture saturated in Romanticism’s effects. Despite Russian radicals’ 
adamant rejection of Romantic ideals during the 1840s,
77
 Romanticism had influenced 
literary and philosophical culture so profoundly that its values or reactions against them 
continued to define much of Russian thought well past the official end of the Romantic 
period. For example, Rudolph Neuhauser identifies the utopian socialism popular in the 
1840s as a version of romantic idealism that survived in a different form after the end of 
the Romantic period.
78
 Conversely, while Romanticism had sought a philosophy of life 
that would bring “all aspects of human experience” into purposeful unity, Romanticism’s 
successors felt that they had inherited a world in which a painful disconnect separated 
reality from the Romantic ideal.
79
 
 Rudolf Neuhauser argues that both Romanticism’s influences and reactions 
against it culminate in Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground.80 It embodies the qualities 
for which Russian intellectuals of the 1860s criticized the recently-ended Romantic 
period. Neuhauser writes that Romanticism came to be seen as “excessive development 
of man’s sensibilities and reflective capabilities to the detriment of his emotional balance, 
and eventually to a loss of the sense of the proper relationship between the subjective 
                                                 
77
 Rudolf Neuhauser, "Romanticism in the Post-Romantic Age: A Typological Study of Antecedents of 
Dostoevsky's Man from the Underground," Canadian-American Slavic Studies, 8.3 (1974 Fall), 335. 
78
 Ibid. 335-36. 
79
 Ibid. 337. 
80
 Ibid. 333, 343-45. 
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world of thought and emotions, and the objective world of concrete sociopolitical 
existence;”81 this description could with complete accuracy be applied directly to Notes 
from Underground. The narrator, the Underground Man, is both an idealistic dreamer
82
 
and a scathing critic of dreamers who hope for utopian socialism,
83
 as Dostoevsky 
himself had.
84
 He loses himself in dreams of his own heroism and chivalry,
85
 as the 
Romantic tradition would encourage, but also experiences moral repulsion at the 
completeness of his failure to meet those ideals in real life (7). His character is shaped by 
Romanticism but simultaneously constitutes evidence of its harmful effects. 
 Dostoevsky considered the influx of Western philosophy and culture into Russia 
to be a corrupting influence, and the Underground Man embodies the effects of that 
corruption. In his introduction to Notes from Underground, Ralph Matlaw describes the 
link that Dostoevsky intends to create between the Underground Man’s inability to 
respond to reality because of his hyperconsciousness and the influence of modern 
Western thought.
86
 Matlaw names Hegel, Rousseau, Kant, and Schiller as primary 
contributors to the philosophical and literary trends that infiltrated Russia from the rest of 
Europe and indicates that Dostoevsky implicitly blames the influence of the West for 
creating the conditions that drive the Underground Man to reveries and their destructive 
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 The Underground Man believes – and it seems that in this case he speaks for Dostoevsky as well – that 
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consequences.
87
 Matlaw describes Dostoevsky’s perspective on the connection between 
Western Romanticism and what I refer to as reveries: “striving for a vague ideal, 
surrendering oneself to pleasant meditations and feelings, seeking refuge in a 
supersensory realm resulted in the blunting of immediate reactions and responses to 
actual things, and escape into daydreaming, meditation, fancy.”88 For Dostoevsky, the 
Underground Man serves as an argument for pochvenichestva, a political platform 
meaning “return to native soil” and proclaiming the need to protect Russia from Western 
influences. 
 
If Notes from Underground is both a product of and Dostoevsky’s protest against 
such large scale cultural and literary trends, why do I argue that that it bears Rousseau’s 
imprint specifically? Even more specifically, why should we study it in relation to 
Reveries of a Solitary Walker? 
 Evidence that Rousseau stands out as one of the primary figures with whose 
literature Dosteovsky’s converses comes, among other things, from the biographical 
similarities between Rousseau as presented in Confessions and various characters in 
Dostoevsky’s novels.89 Robin Miller lists The Insulted and Injured, Notes from 
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 Dostoevsky, Notes, 7; Matlaw, Introduction, xvi-xvii. 
88
 Matlaw, Introduction xvi. 
89
 For example, Robin Miller discusses the parallels between Stepan Verkhovensky in Dostoevsky’s The 
Possessed (1872) and Rousseau as presented in Confessions. Miller describes Stepan as “sentimental, 
timorous, middle-aged," and “preoccupied with imagined conspiracies and persecutions" (87). Like 
Rousseau, Stepan depends on a woman to whom he is not married for emotional and financial support (95-
96). Stepan gives away his children and later in life adopts a new style of clothing to represent a change in 
his philosophy. Nikolai Stavrogin is also a parody of Rousseau; he began writing his personal statement at 
age fifty-three, the same age at which Rousseau began writing Confessions. After completing his personal 
statement, Stavrogin intends to hand it out to many people but changes his mind and decides instead to 
entrust it to a monk to do with it what he will. Stavrogin’s actions seem to be inspired by Rousseau’s failed 
attempt to place Dialogues on the Altar at Notre Dame and subsequent attempts to give it to acquaintances 
and then any passer-by who would accept a copy (89). See Robin Miller, Dostoevsky’s Unfinished Journey 
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Underground, Crime and Punishment, The Idiot, "The Dream of a Ridiculous Man," and  
A Raw Youth as all containing “both polemic and parody directed at Rousseau."90 Critics 
who study Rousseau’s influence on Dostoevsky most often discuss Confessions.91 Some 
compare Dostoevsky’s work to Discourse on the Origins of Inequality.92 The emphasis 
on Confessions, including in the study of Notes from Underground, is not without reason. 
In fact, Notes from Underground demands comparison to Rousseau's Confessions by 
mentioning the work explicitly in the text. Nevertheless, the Underground Man draws the 
same distinction between Notes and Confessions that Rousseau drew between Reveries 
and Montaigne’s Essays; this provides one of the reasons for which I categorize Notes as 
a reverie. I argue that we must study Notes from Underground in conjunction with 
Reveries of a Solitary Walker specifically because it too employs the reverie mode, more 
so than the confessional.
93
 
 
Notes from Underground: Another Reverie 
The Underground Man draws both parallels and contrasts between himself and 
Rousseau. Before mentioning Rousseau’s name, the Underground Man echoes the claim 
with which Rousseau opens Confessions. Rousseau had written, "I will lay open to my 
                                                                                                                                                 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 87-104. Tanya Mairs discusses Prince Myshkin as a parody 
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fellow-mortals a man just as nature wrought him; and this man is myself. …I have 
exposed myself as I was, contemptible and vile some times; at others, good, generous, 
and sublime.”94 The Underground Man almost repeats after him: "I want to try to 
experiment whether one can be perfectly frank, even with oneself, and not take fright at 
the whole truth” (Notes 36). Then, as if acknowledging that he has just imitated 
Confessions, he explicitly compares his own writing project to Confessions. He repeats a 
well-known criticism of Rousseau, saying, "Heine maintains that true autobiography is 
almost an impossibility, and that man is bound to lie about himself. He considers that 
Rousseau certainly told lies about himself in his confessions, and even intentionally lied, 
out of vanity” (37). Then he affirms Heine’s judgment and claims his own likeness to 
Rousseau:  “I understand very well that sometimes one may, just out of sheer vanity, 
attribute regular crimes to oneself, and indeed I can very well conceive of that kind of 
vanity.” To the common reader, it is not immediately obvious that “vanity” would cause a 
writer to “attribute regular crimes to oneself.” One would expect the opposite. So with 
this statement the Underground Man claims a strong and strange similarity of character to 
Rousseau of the Confessions. 
Nevertheless, the Underground Man expects to be taken seriously when he 
undertakes the same task that he and Heine agree was impossible for Rousseau. Why 
would he expect his readers to believe that he can do what Rousseau could not – that is, 
to “be perfectly frank…and not take fright at the whole truth”? The Underground Man 
answers this question by claiming one of the characteristics that distinguishes Rousseau’s 
Reveries from Confessions and Essays. Rousseau wrote that Montaigne "wrote his essays 
entirely for others, whereas I am writing my reveries entirely for myself” (Reveries 9). 
                                                 
94
 Rousseau, Confessions 3,4. 
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The Underground Man writes, "Heine judged people who made their confessions to the 
public. I, however, am writing for myself" (Notes 37). Apparently, the Underground Man 
considers the audience important for his ability to speak truth; he hopes to speak honestly 
to himself but doubts that he or anyone can be fully open with others. 
The Underground Man’s claim that he is writing for no external audience is 
surprising because throughout Part I, he has spoken directly to “the gentlemen,” 
anticipating their reactions, addressing the arguments he expects them to have, and 
answering the objections he expects them to make (4). But here, when he stops 
explaining his beliefs in order to describe his writing project and its purpose, he says that 
“if I write as though I were addressing readers, that is simply because it is easier for me 
to write in that way. It is merely a question of form, only an empty form – I shall never 
have readers” (37). But the “gentlemen” substantially facilitate his ability to 
communicate. By speaking to them, he shows us how he expects that others perceive 
him. For example, when he describes the ongoing conflict within him between conjured 
“spite” and opposing impulses that he smothers, he turns to the gentlemen and says, 
“Well, are you not imagining, gentlemen, that I am repenting for something now, that I 
am asking your forgiveness for something? I am sure you are imagining that” (5). This 
false conversation allows the Underground Man to express a component of his 
consciousness – the part that constantly monitors or imagines how others see him. In 
section eight of Part I, the conversation seems to become more real, as the words he 
expects the gentlemen to say have quotation marks around them.
95
 Furthermore, their 
                                                 
95
 This section begins, “‘Ha! Ha! Ha! But after all, if you like, in reality, there is no such thing as choice,’ 
you will interrupt with a laugh. ‘Science has now succeeded in analyzing man to such an extent that we 
know already that choice and what is called freedom of will are nothing other than – ” (24). Then the 
Underground Man interrupts his supposedly non-existent readers in order to respond. 
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arguments are not invented concoctions of unrelated ideas; they summarize popular 
philosophical arguments of Dosteovsky’s contemporaries.96 The Underground Man’s 
extended dialogue with proponents of real views seems to overshadow the weight of a 
single claim that he will not have readers.
97
  
Nevertheless, given the Underground Man’s character, it is also likely that he 
would create realistic but imaginary listeners within his own mind simply for his own 
benefit. Rudolph Neuhauser, Olga Stuchebrukhov, and Richard Peace talk about the 
Underground Man’s audience as imaginary figures.98 The Underground Man is so 
controlled by fear of others’ opinions of him that he may create imaginary observers and 
objectors and practice answering them in his mind in order to assure himself that he 
would be able to defend himself were he to interact with real people with the same 
reactions. At the same time, his intense self-awareness and self-absorption block his 
ability to perceive others’ reactions to him objectively, so it makes sense that the 
gentlemen’s emotional responses to him – their confusion, frustration, and disdain – 
reflect the Underground Man’s own self-perception. 
                                                 
96
 The gentlemen tell him that science will eventually allow us to predict all of men’s choices by 
determining what is in their best interest and making those interests known to them. Assuming men always 
act rationally and according to their own interests, even the exercise of their “so-called free will” will 
become predictable (24-26). This is Chernyshevsky’s view, expressed in his novel What Is to Be 
Done?(1863), and to which the Underground Man also summarizes and responds to in section seven (19-
24). 
97
 It is important to keep in mind, however, that unlike Rousseau in Reveries, the Underground Man is a 
created character. Furthermore, Notes from Underground contains two layers of narrative. The outer layer 
contains the author’s opening footnote and ending comment about the Underground Man and his “notes” 
(3). The inner layer, written by the Underground Man about his views and his life, compose the bulk of the 
novel. Only this inner layer, fictionally written by the Underground Man, is a reverie, and the 
correspondence between the beliefs of the gentlemen, who exist on the same narrative layer as the 
Underground Man, and those of Dostoevsky’s contemporaries does not imply the Underground Man 
expects his “notes” to be read. Dostoevsky undoubtedly expected that the novel as a whole would have an 
audience other than himself and intends to present his readers with an argument against his philosophies. 
98
 Neuhauser, “Romanticism in a Post-Romantic Age,” 344; Stuchebrukhov, “‘Ridiculous Dream’ versus 
Social Contract,” 36. 
 59 
 The Underground Man’s readers are neither clearly identified as real people nor 
wholly fictitious. The text gives reason to question (but not definitive evidence against) 
the narrator’s claim that he will have no readers. Therefore, I argue that Notes from 
Underground employs the reverie mode. It captures the narrator’s internal conflict 
between a desire to communicate and a fear of personal connection.99 Part I resembles a 
philosophical essay, using the term generally; but “reverie” more accurately describes it 
than “essay” because the tension within the Underground Man and his own doubt in what 
he says are just as central to the overall meaning of the text as are the content of his ideas. 
By giving a voice to the opinions he expects others to have of him, he reveals his own 
character flaws along with his philosophical views.  
 
In the last section of Part I, the Underground Man asks twice why he writes “as 
though I were addressing readers” (37). His answer also provides insight into his reasons 
for writing notes at all, and these reasons in correspond to Rousseau’s in writing 
Reveries. He hopes that writing will release internal tension, allow him to reach a more 
acceptable self-image, and provide resolution to some of the conflicting impulses that he 
finds within himself and does not understand. The accomplishment of each goal provides 
him with some internal benefit; the reverie is not primarily design to communicate 
anything to or accomplish anything in relation to the public. 
The Underground Man begins his response to the question about why he writes as 
if to the gentlemen like this:  
                                                 
99
 The gentlemen actually point out this aspect of the Underground Man’s character. They tell him, “you 
doubtlessly mean to say something, but hide your real meaning for fear, because you lack the resolution to 
say it, and only have a cowardly impudence” (Notes 36). 
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Incidentally, there is a whole psychological system in this. Or, perhaps, I am 
simply a coward. And perhaps also, that I purposely imagine an audience before 
me in order to conduct myself in a more dignified manner while I am jotting 
things down. There are perhaps thousands of reasons. 
…why should I not simply recall these incidents in my own mind without 
putting them down on paper? 
Quite so; but yet it is somehow more dignified on paper. There is 
something more impressive in it; I will be able to criticize myself better and 
improve my style. Besides, perhaps I will really get relief from writing. Today, 
for instance, I am particularly oppressed by a certain memory from the distant 
past. …For some reason I believe that if I write it down I will get rid of it. (37-38) 
 
We have already examined portions of this passage in the previous chapter, where I 
pointed out satires of Rousseau below the surface of the text. But the same passage also 
highlights characteristics of Notes that show that it itself is a reverie. 
 First, although he does not explain exactly what he means by this, he 
acknowledges that a “psychological system” underlies the way he writes. That is, some 
internal motivation or need prompts his writing. At least one instance of this internal 
motivation is his desire to find “relief” from an oppressive memory and his hope that 
writing will give him that relief. Both of these statements demonstrate characteristics of 
the reverie mode: that writing flows from the writer’s internal experience and that the 
written product exists for the writer’s benefit. Communication is not its primary purpose. 
 Second, the Underground Man writes in order to create a more acceptable self-
perception. He repeats this idea twice, first in answer to the question about why he speaks 
to the gentlemen and then in answer to the question of why he writes at all. Writing, he 
says, will make him to “conduct myself in a more dignified manner” and create 
something “impressive.” His underlying desire for self-improvement mirrors Rousseau’s 
intent to justify himself in his own eyes by writing Reveries. Although the Underground 
Man claims he only seeks to “improve my style,” that is, his writing style, the novel’s 
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tone and earlier passages indicate that it is really his character that he wishes to 
“improve.”100 This is not merely an attempt to win others’ approval; he seeks to fulfill a 
deep need to accept himself. An earlier statement confirms this desire and its self-
directedness: he writes that "the whole work of man seems really to consist in nothing but 
proving to himself continually that he is a man and not an organ stop" (29, emphasis 
added). In context, the Underground Man uses this statement to explain that men take 
irrational actions in order to convince themselves of their ability to make independent 
choices, an ability that Dostoevsky saw as essential to being and feeling fully human.
101
 
The Underground Man’s position reveals his underlying uncertainty of his own identity 
and his lack of self-confidence, both of which characterize reverie writers. His attempt to 
improve his self-image through writing confirms that reveries are written for the writer’s 
sake, not the readers’. 
 Finally, as in Reveries of a Solitary Walker, a search for deeper understanding of 
oneself accompanies the process of self-justification. The second explanation the 
Underground Man offers for writing to the gentlemen is that "perhaps, I am simply a 
coward." He cannot even claim cowardice with confidence; he seems totally unsure of his 
own identity and wonders whether some internal, inexplicable part of his character makes 
him write the way he does. But his inability to pin-point his own motivations frustrates 
him and calls to mind Rousseau’s realization that “the real and essential motives of most 
of my actions are not as clear to me as I had for a long time imagined them to be” 
                                                 
100
 For example, when he describes his irresistible tendency to take actions that he hates, he is frustrated by 
the resulting “hyperconsciousness of one’s own degradation; it was from feeling…that it could not be 
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sanity, humans needed to exercise their independence and assert their innate dignity (Frank 215). 
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(Reveries 60). Rousseau responds with self-investigation aimed at perfecting his self-
knowledge, and the Underground Man states a similar reason for writing his notes. Early 
in his discussion of his inner torment, he describes the experience of understanding good 
but only being able to do evil. Somehow, he finds “shameful accursed sweetness” in his 
inability to do good, and that “sweetness” morphs into “real positive enjoyment” of his 
predicament (Notes 8). A few paragraphs later, he bursts out, "But enough. Bah, I have 
talked a lot of nonsense, but what have I explained? Can this enjoyment be explained? 
But I will explain it! I will get to the bottom of it! That is why I have taken up my pen." 
He writes in order to “explain” the strange experiences and conflicts he finds within 
himself. He hates what introspection shows him and responds just like Rousseau: he 
writes. The result is a reverie. 
 
 Finally, Notes from Underground’s organization qualifies it as a reverie as well. It 
follows no logical or chronological sequence but follows the twistings and turnings of the 
Underground Man’s mind. His thought process controls his writing; it is primarily an 
expression of his internal experience. The Underground Man recognizes this 
characteristic of his writing, and in doing so he echoes Rousseau again. He writes that "I 
don’t wish to be hampered by any restrictions in compiling my notes. I shall not attempt 
any system or method. I will jot things down as I remember them" (37). Compare his 
statement to Rousseau’s: "my mind wander[s] quite freely and my ideas follow their own 
course unhindered and untroubled," resulting in “a shapeless account of my reveries. ...I 
shall say what I have thought just as it came to me” (Reveries 11, 8). Either Dostoevsky 
purposely imitates Rousseau, or the nature and content of the Underground Man’s writing 
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project demand the same form as Reveries. In either case, Notes seems much more like a 
reverie than a confession or an essay. Notes appears to have been spontaneously created 
and shows no evidence of a narrator pausing to consider how to best communicate ideas 
to a reader. The narrator calls himself as a “babbler” (17), a term that connotes rambling, 
nonsensical speech and calls to mind the original meanings of the word “reverie.”102 So 
in organization as well as purpose and audience, Notes from Underground matches 
Reveries of a Solitary Walker and displays characteristics of the reverie mode. 
 
Dreaming Underground: Hyperconsciousness Gone Wrong 
Rudolph Neuhauser calls the Underground Man the “culmination of the romantic 
dreamer of the 1840s.”103 Earlier, he lists several characteristics for which Russians in the 
1830s and 40s criticized European romantic literature; the Underground Man displays 
nearly all of them. Among the characteristics Neuhauser lists are “bookish[ness],”104 
being “divorced from reality,”105 “dreaming and…a nebulous imagination…a lack of 
ability to cope with life;…and a life in seclusion.”106 These criticisms of romantic 
literature appeared decades before Dostoevsky wrote Notes from Underground, but it 
seems that they could not be more accurate if they had been specifically describing the 
Underground Man. Yet I argue that he is not purely a product of the romantic tradition. 
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Understanding Notes from Underground as a reverie allows us to see components of the 
Underground Man’s experience that Rousseau and Prufrock share. The Underground 
Man is the first of these three to use the term “hyperconsciousness,” but the mental 
tendencies to which the term refers existed before him, as the striking similarities 
between his character and Rousseau’s show. The Underground Man experiences reveries 
in an urban environment, unlike Rousseau, and his reverie highlights reveries’ harmful 
effects on the dreamer. So although the Underground Man’s psychological corruption 
partially reflects flaws in his physical, sociological and philosophical environment, 
Dostoevsky also illustrates the dangers of immersing oneself exclusively in one’s own 
mind and imagination.  
 
 Ironically, dreaming counteracts many of the purposes for which the Underground 
seemed to be writing his notes. He claims to seek a more accurate understanding of 
himself, but dreaming leads him to self-deception instead. He alludes to a deep discontent 
with his character and a desire to “improve” himself, but elsewhere he acknowledges that 
imagining himself as a hero, as he tends to do, destroys his motivation to seek real 
change. The gentlemen pointed out that he seems to be trying to communicate with them 
but too afraid of real connection to do so successfully. His reveries significantly worsen 
his ability to create strong connections with people, leading him instead to self-absorption 
and an inability to relate to real people. Dostoevsky highlights these negative 
consequences of isolation and overreliance on one’s imagination; but the exaggeration of 
these effects in the Underground Man reveals their presence in Rousseau as well. 
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First, the Underground Man’s dreams produce an inflated, unrealistic self-image. 
At the beginning of Part II, he describes an incident in which he attempted to assert his 
equality to an officer who, years earlier, had lifted him out of his way during a billiards 
game (45). The Underground Man tries to revenge his wounded pride by bumping 
shoulders with this man on the street instead of stepping to the side, as one would do for a 
social superior, and in preparation for this high-stakes action, he buys a beaver collar to 
attach to his coat (51). Afterwards, he begins to describe his dreams and says that in them 
“I had no resemblance to the gentleman who, in his chicken-hearted anxiety, put a 
German beaver collar on his greatcoat” (52). He was that man; but in his imagination, he 
bears “no resemblance” to the way he acts in reality. Likewise, when he dreams about 
Liza between their first and second encounters, he imagines himself as her “savior” 
(104). During their actual interactions, however he only crushes her hope and self-esteem 
even further by confirming through his attitude and actions that she exists to serve men’s 
desires – whether physical desires or the desire to assert emotional or social superiority. 
In both cases, exercising his imagination results in self-deception. 
The Underground Man acknowledges that the self he imagines is much more 
imposing, strong, and honorable than he is in reality. Rousseau also holds an 
unrealistically high view of himself but shows no signs recognizing that he does not meet 
his own ideals. As he thinks about himself he concludes that “my heart has been purified 
in the crucible of adversity, and when I examine it carefully I find hardly a trace of any 
guilty inclinations" (Reveries 8). He considers himself perfect and upright – perhaps not 
innately so, but to have reached that state through purifying trials. This, too, seems like a 
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form of self-deception; but unlike the Underground Man, Rousseau does not realize that 
his self-image results from a confined perspective and not an objective self-evaluation. 
 Even to the limited extent to which the Underground Man does know his own 
failures, however, his dreams keep him from fighting the vices he sees in himself. He 
imagines himself as a pure, beneficent, honorable, imposing hero (52), and the “contrast” 
between that self-image and his actual character produces a mixture of “contradictions 
and sufferings, of agonizing inward analysis, and…torments and pin-pricks” (53) that 
prevent him from becoming bored with himself. He finds strange pleasure in analyzing 
the difference between himself and his ideal and therefore traps himself in cycles of self-
analysis that produces no real change.  
Finally, the Underground Man’s dreams make him even less capable of healthy 
relationships. First, this results from his taking imagined actions as substitutes for real 
ones. The life he imagines for himself seems to him more immediate and potent than his 
real life, so he contents himself with imagined experiences instead of seeking to live up to 
his idealistic principles. In the same revelation of his dream world described above, he 
writes, "what love I felt at times in those dreams of mine! …though it was fantastic love, 
though it was never applied to anything human in reality, yet there was so much of this 
love that afterward one did not even feel the impulse to apply it to anything in reality" 
(53). His reveries are so strong that they obliterate his desire to take comparable actions 
“in reality.”  
The Underground Man knows that his mind’s creations are not reality but chooses 
to settle for them (although he does not speak as though he believes himself to be 
choosing the lesser of two options). This sentiment resembles Rousseau’s discussion of 
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his resistance to obligation in the Sixth Walk. He claims that if he had been able to live 
apart from society, “free, unknown, and isolated, as I was meant to be, I would have done 
only good: for I do not have in my heart the seeds of any harmful passion” (Reveries 66). 
In “civil society,” however, which creates “irritation, obligation, and duty,” he feels “the 
yoke of necessity or men, [and] I become rebellious, or, rather, stubborn, and am then 
incapable of doing good” (67-68). In other words, in his ideal, pre-social world, he 
believes he would exercise perfect love and benevolence. Like the Underground Man, he 
considers himself a potential moral hero, corrupted by his environment and not his own 
nature. Both contemplate love as an ideal and convince themselves that contemplating it 
is enough and they need not carry it out.107 
When he does attempt to interact with real people outside of his imagination, he is 
so self-absorbed that he does them no good. Throughout a seventeen-page conversation 
with Liza, he continually turns the topic back to himself and his ideas. He begins by 
asking her questions, and he pretends to care for her well-being and to give her advice. 
But he acknowledges that “the sport in it attracted me most,” and his primary purpose 
seems to be convincing her of ideas that he considers important (Notes 87). Following 
brief moments in which he begins to notice her emotions or to realize that she may want 
to speak, he seizes control of the conversation again to focus it squarely on himself. He 
comes close to allowing her to share her life story when she questions his assertion that it 
must be better it is to live in one’s father’s home than to live at a brothel. But before she 
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 For Rousseau, the supposed justification for his failure to act benevolently in real society is his 
“independent nature” (Reveries 67). This line of reasoning reveals a belief in moral determinism similar to 
the Underground Man’s – that is, that in any given circumstance, someone with a given character only has 
one possible action.    
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can explain her experiences, he fears that he “was flattering her” and redirects the 
conversation: “See, Liza, I will tell you about myself.”   
The Underground Man realizes losing himself in his own imagination and 
perspective distances himself from the actual world, and that disconnect results in “moral 
rot” (121). His moral rot causes emotional harm to those with whom he attempts to 
interact. Even worse than his persistent self-centeredness is his pretense of care, 
expressed for his own amusement and hiding his hatred. When Liza comes to visit him as 
he instructed her to, he openly tells her that he came to her to release his anger against the 
men he had gone to dinner with. He tells her, “I had been humiliated, so I wanted to 
humiliate; I had been treated like a rag, so I wanted to show my power. That’s what it 
was, and you imagined I had come there on purpose to save you, didn’t you?” (113). 
Because he dreams of himself as a benevolent hero, however, he expresses this desire to 
humiliate and to demonstrate his power by pretending to feel compassion for Liza, 
encouraging her to seek a better life, and even implying that he might help her escape the 
brothel. Once she comes to visit him and he is somewhat more free from the compulsion 
to manipulate, he speaks to her more honestly. As he presents the real contents of his 
heart on the night he spent with her, he tells her that by the time he returned home, "I 
hated you already because of the lies I had told you. Because I only like to play with 
words, to dream in my mind, but, do you know, what I really want is that you would all 
go to hell" (114). His hatred and lack of concern for her as a fellow human being are 
harmful enough, but it is his romantic reveries that cause him to create a lofty, apparently 
beneficent exterior to cover his hatred, inspire some degree of trust, and make the 
destruction of her hopes even more painful. Reveries provide a temporary escape or 
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create a temporary disguise for violent emotions that build up towards real experiences 
and people; when the reverie fades, the dreamer explodes.  
Finally, reveries have corrupted the Underground Man’s perception of reality so 
much that even if he wished to improve his interactions with real people, he no longer 
finds himself easily able to understand them. When Liza understands more than he 
expected her to about his motivation for pretending to care for her, he is shocked and 
writes, “I was so accustomed to think and imagine everything from books, and to picture 
everything in the world to myself just as I had made it up in my dreams beforehand, that I 
could not even take in this strange circumstance at once” (115). This comment confirms 
that his dreams are entirely unlike reality and influence his actions more than real 
experiences do. When reality does not match his imagined version, he does not know 
how to react. He embodies the harmful effects of reveries and self-contemplation that 
Dostoevsky’s contemporaries feared. Joseph Frank writes that "high-flown Romantic 
ideals and attitudes are denounced as leading to a debilitating withdrawal from the world 
and the cultivation of a self-satisfied attitude of exalted contemplation.”108 Both Rousseau 
and the Underground Man perfectly fit this description. 
 
Notes from Underground further develops the reverie mode that Rousseau began 
with Reveries of a Solitary Walker. Beyond its formal characteristics, it centers on the 
narrator’s internal experiences, especially those of his wandering mind, philosophical 
contemplations, and exaggerated imagination. Rousseau claims to find pleasing peace 
and delight in his reveries, but the Underground Man, while he too finds them attractive, 
is much more aware of their destructive power. Examined next to the Underground 
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Man’s exaggerated example, Rousseau too shows signs of the effects of trusting his 
imagination and free-floating mind. As their contemporaries feared, reveries led both 
writers elevate subjective opinions or emotions to the position of concrete truth, to reach 
strange philosophical conclusions, and to lose touch with reality. Neither writer’s culture 
encouraged reveries; but insight into similar human experiences (as well as Dostoevsky’s 
familiarity with Rousseau’s writing, I believe) resulted in similar literary methods of 
capturing those experiences. 
 
 In the previous chapter, I used the terms “hyperconsciousness” and “hyper-self-
consciousness” to describe Rousseau’s philosophical contemplation, self-analysis, fear of 
others’ opinions, and paranoia. Rousseau has varying reactions to different components 
of his hyperconsciousness; he enjoys exercising his imagination and examining his soul 
but is clearly tormented by continual effort to monitor his appearance before others and 
maintain vigilant suspicion of them. Dostoevsky and the Underground Man have no such 
mixed feelings; the Underground Man calls hyperconsciousness a “disease” (6).109 Being 
a created character, unlike Rousseau of Reveries, the Underground Man serves as 
Dostoevsky’s means of offering social critique; his exaggerated and destructive 
hyperconsciousness is a criticism of the society that produced it.
110
 Specifically, it reflects 
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 Notice the connection to one of the original French definitions of “reverie:” “délire causé par une 
maladie ou autrement” (delirium caused by one illness or another). (“reverie, s.f.”. Dictionnaire de 
l'Académie française.) According to this definition and the Underground Man’s statement, both 
hyperconsciousness and reveries are active, highly imaginative but unhealthy states of mind produced by 
some sickness. The Underground Man also claims to be physically sick (3), and his refusal to see a doctor 
echoes Rousseau’s scorn for medicine (Reveries 74). 
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 The Underground Man himself seems to believe that his psychology is the result of his own character, 
but in Dostoevsky’s opening note, he identifies the narrator as an “imaginary” character who represents the 
“current generation” of people who “positively must exist in our society, considering those circumstances 
under which our society was in general formed” (3). In other words, Dostoevsky attributes his narrator’s 
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on the new form of loneliness that exists in cities. Rousseau was isolated and lost in his 
own mind while living on a barely-inhabited island or rural estates; he was alone in his 
loneliness. In the urban environment, however, the Underground Man finds isolation 
amidst crowds of people. His loneliness and unattractive physical environment combine 
with his self-awareness and contemplation of ideals to intensify his desire for something 
beyond having his physical needs met. He tells his listeners, “I will not accept as the 
crown of my desires a block of buildings with apartments for the poor…. Destroy my 
desires, eradicate my ideals, show me something better, and I will follow you” (34). He 
finds his “ideals” and “desires” unaddressed by society’s materialism. His frustration 
fuels the novel’s social critique of a society primarily concerned with scientific progress. 
Furthermore, these “apartments” epitomize urban isolation: they contain many people but 
separate them from one another. The Underground Man’s hyperconsciousness expresses 
itself differently than Rousseau’s because of his different setting, but nevertheless his 
experiences strongly parallel Rousseau’s.  
 
The Underground Man’s description of hyperconsciousness includes components 
that I categorize as hyperconsciousness and as hyper-self-consciousness. That is, it gives 
him a heightened awareness of factors both internal and external to himself. First, he 
explains his “hyperconsciousness of one’s own degradation” (8). This form of hyper-self-
consciousness results from his awareness that the more he understands “‘all the sublime 
and the beautiful,’” ideals to which he aspires, the more he feels compelled to do 
“hideous things” (7). His intense sense of failure and inability to live up his ideals make 
                                                                                                                                                 
faults to sociological conditions that shaped him. See Richard Peace, Dostoevsky’s Notes from 
Underground (London: Bristol Classical Press, 1993), 3. 
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him ashamed of himself. But, paradoxically, as he becomes more convinced of his 
“depravity,” he also begins to believe that his condition was “not in the least disease or 
depravity” but “my most normal condition” (7). So his self-awareness seems like a 
disease because it causes him moral pain and internal tension; yet he does not want to 
consider it a disease because it seems like an inevitable condition.  
The apparent inevitability of the Underground Man’s compulsion to do things he 
hates comes from his belief in moral determinism, which Rousseau in some instances 
seems to share. Moral determinism holds that in any given circumstance, a person with a 
given character can respond in only one way. This belief underlies the Underground 
Man’s belief that he can neither change his character or refrain from the “hideous things” 
he sometimes feels compelled to do (7,8). Rousseau reaches a similar belief – that 
humans have little control over their own actions but act according to their character – 
towards the end of his life. Describing his opponents in a calmer tone than he had in 
earlier Walks, Rousseau writes that in their interactions with him they are “nothing but 
mechanical beings, who acted only on impulse and whose actions could calculate only 
according to the laws of motion” (Reveries 87). That is, he chooses not to blame them for 
their actions because he believes that given their characters and situations, they could not 
have acted any differently. The belief in moral determinism also constitutes a form of 
perceived hyper-consciousness, or greater insight into the laws directing the universe than 
most people have access to. 
The Underground Man’s belief in moral determinism leads him to a sort of 
internal inaction; he does not believe his character to be malleable, regardless of his 
efforts. This type of perceived paralysis of character differs from the inaction Rousseau 
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and Prufrock face because of their hyperconsciousness. To the extent that 
hyperconsciousness caused Rousseau inaction, it came in the form of daydreaming 
instead of doing some more visible type of work. He also avoided social interaction and 
believed that the plot against him would any action he might take ineffective.  For 
Prufrock, hyperconsciousness leads to indecision that, at least within the scope of the 
poem, really does prevent him from taking any external action. When the idea to do 
something specific settles into his mind, it pulls him into cycles of evaluation, analysis, 
predictions of others’ reactions that eventually paralyze his will. 
 Although the Underground Man’s hyperconsciousness does not remove his ability 
to take external action, it does prevent him from believing that he has any rational basis 
for action. His hyper-self-consciousness, or awareness of his inability to meet his ideals, 
and his hyperconsciousness, or awareness of principles outside himself, collide in his 
explanation for his belief that although he hates what he does, he “could not be otherwise; 
that you no longer had an escape; that you could never become a different person” (8). 
He calls this inability to change “inertia,” “the direct, legitimate, immediate fruit of 
consciousness” (8, 16), and contrasts his condition of necessary stagnation with 
“straightforward persons and men of action,”111 who “take immediate and secondary 
causes for primary ones, and in that way persuade themselves…that they have found an 
infallible basis for their activity.” His denial that human will is the primary cause for 
man’s actions demonstrates that he takes himself to be hyper-conscious – that is, to 
understand the way the universe functions more accurately than most. 
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 “Men of action,” as the Underground Man calls them, are those who do not suffer from 
hyperconsciousness. Believing themselves to have rational basis for action, they do not hesitate to act. The 
Underground Man calls them “stupid” (10). Interestingly, he alludes to Rousseau as a “real normal man,” 
the “antithesis” of hyperconscious men (Notes 10; Peace, Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground 10). 
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But although he denies that what most people consider to be primary causes truly 
are, he lacks an alternative suggestion for what is the first cause, and he defines 
consciousness in terms of the endless search for a primary cause.
112
  “Where are the 
primary causes on which I am to build?...I exercise myself in the process of thinking, and 
consequently with me every primary cause at once draws after itself still another more 
primary, and so on to infinity. That is precisely the essence of every sort of consciousness 
and thinking” (16). This definition of consciousness also explains his “inertia.” 
Consciousness consists primarily in seeking to know the underlying causes of everything 
one sees. For our narrator, knowing these causes is essential for setting one’s “mind…at 
ease” and a prerequisite for action. Presumably, he never discovers the first causes113 he 
seeks, and therefore never finds satisfactory basis for action. He is left in “inertia.” And 
yet he carries his argument even one step further: if no one is the primary cause of his 
own action, no can blame others or be blamed for his actions (8, 17). He writes regarding 
his inability to resist impulses to do what he believes to be wrong,  
And the worst of it…was that it all proceeded according to the normal and 
fundamental laws of hyperconsciousness, and with the inertia that was the direct 
result of those laws, and that consequently one could not only not change but one 
could do absolutely nothing. Thus it would follow, as the result of 
hyperconsciousness, that one is not to blame for being a scoundrel. (8) 
 
                                                 
112
 This passage presents one of many objections to philosophical positions presented in Nikolay 
Chernyshevsky’s novel, What Is To Be Done? (1863). Chernyshevsky argues that the root cause of any 
action is man’s self-interest (Peace, Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, 86). As Dostoevsky prepares to 
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saying that humans do not understand primary causes as fully as they believe themselves to. 
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philosophical problems result from rejecting God. Encyclopedia Britannica Online, s. v. “Aristotle,” 
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This conclusion eliminates the possibility of justified revenge, and although the 
Underground Man hates this conclusion, he finds no convincing reason to reject it. His 
belief that human will does not determine human activity as directly as most people take 
it to leaves him with no ability to justify his actions in his own eyes. 
But this belief does not prevent the Underground Man from taking action. He 
seems to suffer from a problem opposite to Rousseau’s and Prufrock’s; instead of being 
unable to motivate himself to take any action, the Underground Man finds himself 
compelled by irrational impulses to take actions that he knows to be unwise. For 
example, as he considers whether to fulfill his promise to meet Simonov and his friends 
for dinner, he concludes going would probably lead to social disaster. But once the idea 
of going has taken root in his mind, he feels that to not go “was the most impossible thing 
of all: once I feel impelled to do anything, I am completely drawn into it, head first” 
(Notes 64). He feels as though some internal force causes him to act against his better 
judgment.  
This and other examples of irrational actions illustrate one of Dostoevsky’s 
central messages: that humans are not purely rational beings who always act in their best 
interest. This is a direct argument against Nikolay Chernyshevsky, whose widely-read 
novel What is To Be Done? (1863) argued that utopia could be achieved in people simply 
understood what was in their best interest, because they would necessarily act 
accordingly.
114
 The Underground Man vocally rejects this position, expressing his and 
Dostoevsky’s belief that the exercise of one’s free will, even for destructive ends, is 
essential to being human (29). He argues that acting irrationally and even to doing “what 
is injurious to himself” can be beneficial because doing so “preserves for us what is most 
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precious and most important – that is, our personality, our individuality” (27). While 
instances such as the Underground Man’s choice to attend the dinner although he knows 
that choice to be foolish demonstrate Dostoevsky’s belief in an essentially irrational 
component of human nature, it is not clear that they truly exemplify the exercise of free 
will. The impulse to go to the dinner does come from within the Underground Man, but if 
he feels irresistibly compelled to go it does not seem that he is exercising free choice. 
 So we see that different components of the Underground Man’s philosophy and 
life seem to contradict each other. He feels compelled to take actions he resists and 
unable to change his own character, but at the same time believes free will to be a 
necessary component of human nature. He sees no rational basis for action but argues 
that it is good to take irrational actions in order to “prove to himself that he is a man and 
not an organ stop” (29). If nothing else, these paradoxes demonstrate the complexity of 
Dostoevsky’s polemic strategy. There are multiple ways to interpret the Underground 
Man’s views and the extent to which they represent Dostoevsky’s. It seems to me, 
however, that one of Dosteovsky’s most central messages is that humans are innately 
irrational and rational egoism therefore cannot be true.  
The Underground Man’s experience of hyperconsciousness differs from 
Rousseau’s in that he has a different understanding of human nature, human will, and the 
relationship between human will and action. But the Underground Man and Rousseau are 
similar in that both spend extensive time lost philosophical reveries and reach radical 
conclusions that shape the way they live.  
The Underground Man’s experiences of hyper-self-consciousness, however, 
parallel Rousseau’s and Prufrock’s more closely. In Part II, when the Underground Man 
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begins to recount experiences from his past, we also see hyper-self-consciousness emerge 
in his deep fear of others’ opinions of him. This type of self-justification more resembles 
Rousseau’s and Prufrock’s. He demonstrates his guttural, soul-controlling fear most 
clearly in his interaction with Liza. His dread of her coming to visit him reveals that any 
desire to help her pales in comparison to his overwhelming repulsion to the possibility of 
losing his heroic appearance and incurring her pity or disdain. The day after his first 
encounter with her, he gives the reader a snapshot of his “incessant” worry that 
dominates his mind: “What if she comes…it’s horrid that she should see how I live for 
instance. Yesterday I seemed such a – hero to her, while now, h’m! It’s horrid, though, 
that I have let myself sink so low, the room looks like a beggar’s” (102). He has no 
thought of showing her kindness but only of how he will appear in her eyes. When she 
does come, his every action communicates fear, shame, insecurity and anxiety. He “stood 
before her crushed, crestfallen, revoltingly embarrassed, and…did my utmost to wrap 
myself in the skirts of my ragged wadded robe” (110). This is the epitome of self-
consciousness: his first instinct is to try to hide himself from her. First he uses his robe; 
but since the robe itself indicates poverty and degradation, he tries to cover himself with 
his words. As anger builds up inside him to hide his shame and fear from himself, he 
says, “‘You have found me in a strange position, Liza. …No, no, don’t imagine anything. 
…I am not ashamed of my poverty. On the contrary, I look on my poverty with pride. I 
am poor but honorable. One can be poor and honorable,’ I muttered, ‘However – would 
you like tea?’” He obviously is ashamed at his poverty and has given her no reason to 
consider him honorable. Perhaps he realizes that his words will not cover the reality of 
his character or his circumstances, so he moves on to another technique: distraction. 
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Although she does not ask for tea, he leaves the room in order to demand that Apollon 
bring some, desperate for someone to come between him and Liza or to provide 
something other than himself for her to think about (111).  
The Underground Man’s attempts to preserve his image before others differ from 
Rousseau’s in that Rousseau is confident of his own rightness and aggressively tries to 
persuade others to agree with him. The Underground Man, on the other hand, has no 
confidence in himself; so instead of relying on more complete self-description to produce 
a more positive image of himself, he tries to shield himself from truly being known and 
create an image of himself distinct from his true identity. Although Rousseau and the 
Underground Man have the same goal – to be thought well of – perhaps the process by 
which the Underground Man attempts to achieve that goal should not rightly be called 
self-justification.
115
 He is not convinced that he is right; so rather than trying to convince 
others that he is right, he tries to deceive them with a false, inflated image of himself. In 
this attempt to create an external appearance in which he himself does not fully believe, 
the Underground Man resembles Prufrock, who speaks of “prepar[ing] a face to meet the 
faces that you meet” (line 27). In other words, he wants to create a “face” other than his 
true identity for the purpose of making a better impression in a social setting. 
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 The Underground Man’s interaction with Liza also reveals his version of the 
paranoia Rousseau exhibits. The Underground Man does not construct complex 
conspiracy theories the way Rousseau did, but intense emotional reactions build up 
within him at the thought of social interactions. Two days after his night with Liza, he 
dismisses his frenzy on the previous day as “nonsense, due to over-excited nerves, and, 
above all, as exaggerated. I always recognized that as a weak point of mine, and was 
sometimes very much afraid of it. ‘I exaggerate everything, that is where I go wrong,’ I 
repeated to myself every hour” (103). But the repetition of this observation “every hour” 
itself represents an attempt to calm still-tense nerves – and on that second day, too, the 
Underground Man “was so uneasy that I sometimes flew into a fury,” in which he runs 
around his apartments and laments “the vileness” and “silliness” of the “sentimental 
souls” who would actually take him at his word when he seemed to show compassion. 
The fear of Liza’s visit paralyzes him and sends him into another round of dreaming. He 
does not fear specific actions or negative intentions where they does not exist, but his 
overwhelmingly intense fear of this and other interactions also deserves to be called 
paranoia and a form of hyper-self-consciousness. 
 In his interactions with Simonov and his former classmates, however, the 
Underground Man does make unjustified assumptions about their attitudes and actions. 
When visits Simonov and his classmates barely seem to notice his presence, he 
concludes, “Evidently, they looked upon me as something on the level of a common fly. 
…I knew, of course, that they must despise me now for my lack of success in the service, 
and for having let myself sink so low, going about badly dressed and so on which seemed 
to them a sign of my inaptitude and insignificance” (56). He attributes attitudes to them 
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that do not follow from the small piece of evidence he has, their failure to pay him much 
attention. On the basis of that fact, he concludes that they consider him sub-human, 
“despise” him for never being promoted at his government job, and believe poverty to be 
a sign of personal worthlessness. These conclusions are based on his deep fear, not 
logical reasoning. Similarly, when Simonov fails to apologize for giving him the wrong 
time for the dinner, the Underground Man concludes that “Evidently he had something 
against me. He must have made up his mind after what happened yesterday” (68).  
Later on in the night, he demonstrates again the overwhelming emotional distress 
with which he responds to the belief that others do not think favorably of him. When the 
other men exclude him from their conversation after dinner, he paces angrily up and 
down the room for three hours (73). His agitation and humiliation accumulate until he 
“was so exhausted, so broken, that I would have cut my throat to put an end to it. I was in 
a fever; my hair, soaked with perspiration, stuck to my forehead and temples” (74). He 
exhausts himself by purposely intensifying his own experience of rejection by focusing 
on his own humiliation as he paces and by refusing to leave the hotel. His sweat and fever 
demonstrate the revulsion he feels towards his own unimpressive appearance in others 
eyes.  
 
 The forms of inaction that result from the Underground Man’s 
hyperconsciousness highlight its harmful effects. The Underground Man is well aware of 
these consequences; he names most of them. I have already discussed how his dreams 
prevent him from seeking personal growth, because the “contrast” between his “vice” and 
the ideals that he imagines living up to keeps him interested (53). So although one of his 
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purposes in writing his notes is to create a more “dignified” self-image for himself, he 
does not wish to accomplish this by actually changing. Rather, he simply wishes to create 
a more pleasing representation, accurate or not, of his still vice-filled self. Just as his 
contemplation of himself in comparison to abstract ideals removes his motivation to 
change himself, he takes his hyper-awareness of determinism to eliminate any good 
reason he would otherwise have for taking external action. He believes that one’s nature 
and circumstances determine one’s actions and, therefore, that people have neither 
“basis” nor “blame” for action (16, 8). The Underground Man’s philosophical 
contemplation leaves him believing that he will not find real justification for any action. 
 The Underground Man so fully and consistently immerses himself in reveries that 
they become the defining factor on how he understands reality. In this sense, reading 
serves the same function as his dreams, because in both he loses himself in a fictional 
world accessed through his imagination. He laments his own “divorce from reality” 
(121), and he identifies both reading and dreaming as the causes. He is shocked when 
Liza responds to him with pity, and he writes, “I was so accustomed to think and imagine 
everything from books, and to picture everything in the world to myself just as I had 
made it up in my dreams beforehand, that I could not even take in this strange 
circumstance all at once” (115). Although in this case Liza responds more positively than 
expected, his surprise illustrates a principle that helps to explain the isolation of all three 
narrators. All three have a set idea of the way others should respond to them; when they 
respond differently, our narrators withdraw instead of working to establish connections 
anyways. Rousseau justifies his withdrawal from society by saying that men do not 
deserve his attention (Reveries 66). They have failed to support him and his views as he 
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expected them to, so Rousseau distances himself completely. In this instance with Liza, 
the Underground Man at first accepts her compassion but gives her money as she leaves, 
reducing their interaction to one of economic rather than personal value (Notes 118). In 
his explanation, he says that “‘real life’ oppressed me with its novelty so much that I 
could hardly breathe.” In other words, because she did not act as he imagined she would, 
he is overwhelmed and cuts off the potential relationship. Prufrock does not give others 
the opportunity to meet or fail to meet his expectations, because he never actually 
interacts with anyone in the poem. But because he is convinced that they will not receive 
him favorably and that he will not be able to communicate effectively, he refrains from 
even attempting. 
 
The Message from Underground 
 As discussed at the beginning of this chapter, the Underground Man’s moral, 
psychological and relational corruption serves as an argument against the influx of 
Western culture, which Dostoevsky blames at least in part for creating the sociological 
and cultural conditions that drive his narrator to hyperconsciousness and reveries. 
Another central message of Notes from Underground, which the Underground Man 
presents somewhat more explicitly but does not follow through to its ultimate conclusion, 
is man’s need for Christ.116 This argument comes in two parts: first, Dostoevsky rejects 
the popular competing view that humans are ultimately rational beings that exist 
primarily to exercise reason and to perfect society by meeting their own needs. In the 
Underground Man’s words and nature, Dostoevsky asserts that humans are not purely 
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rational and need more than material comfort and logical reasoning to satisfy their souls. 
This part of his argument is explicitly stated. Using a chicken coop that shelters him from 
the rain as a metaphor for a society intended only to meet physical needs, he responds in 
Section Ten of Part One to those who tell him that he should be content with a chicken 
coop, “Yes, I answer, if one had to live simply to avoid getting wet. But what is to be 
done if I have taken it into my head that this is not the only object in life?” (33). He 
expects his readers to find his desire for something more than technological advancement 
and material comfort can provide ridiculous, but the Underground Man tells them, 
“Laugh away; I will put up with all your laughter rather than pretend that I am satisfied 
when I am hungry.”  
Neither do his dreams provide intangible satisfaction, as Rousseau claimed that 
his, along with his study of the natural world, did. The Underground Man tries to tell 
himself that “better conscious inertia” than a lack of hyperconsciousness. But he 
interrupts himself midsentence: “Bah! But after all, even now I am lying! I am lying 
because I know myself as surely as two times two makes four, that it is not at all 
underground that is better, but something different, quite different, for which I long but 
which I cannot find! Damn underground!” (35). Joseph Frank writes that before the 
censors “mutilated” Section Ten, it clearly expressed that that “something different…for 
which I long” was Christ.117 In the publication of Notes from Underground, Dostoevsky 
expressed his frustration with the censors for removing explicit references to Christ, who 
alone could satisfy spiritual longings. But the Underground Man, left without any 
knowledge of Christ in the published version of Notes, never finds what he seeks. 
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Rousseau and Prufrock show the same discontent with their imagined worlds, 
although they try to portray themselves as more “resigned” to their places in life. 
Rousseau admits that even the highest source of happiness that he has found does not 
fully satisfy him. After describing the ideal state of contemplation in some detail,
118
 he 
claims that the one who reaches the ideal state of reverie has found “a sufficient, perfect, 
and full happiness, which leaves in the soul no void needing to be filled” (Reveries 55). 
And yet the sad tone with which he describes his separation from society belies his claim 
that his soul is content. In the previous chapter, I described the sadness he expresses at his 
aloneness. In his Ninth Walk, he reiterates his loneliness more poignantly, wishing he 
could “enjoy a few moments of pure, heartfelt affection, even if only from a babe in 
arms” so that he “would no longer be obliged to seek among animals the kind looks that I 
am now refused by human beings” (97-98). He knows that he has relational needs that 
reveries cannot fill. Although he enjoys a sense of connection to the natural world, and 
even tangentially to God through Creation,
119
 his immersion in nature cannot ultimately 
replace social relationships. Rousseau’s sense of unfulfillment is not the same as the 
Underground Man’s deep spiritual cravings, but they are similar in that the only thing 
Rousseau can identify as the ultimate source of happiness – contemplation of self and of 
the natural world – cannot fulfill it, just as what the Underground Man’s surrounding 
culture tells him should satisfy him (material comfort, technological advancement, and 
rational activity) does not. 
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 Prufrock finds his reveries similarly unsatisfying. His entire poem expresses his 
imagination in that he takes no external actions but only speculates about what would 
happen if he did. Afraid of the possibilities and paralyzed by uncertainty, he never takes 
action. Throughout the poem, he longs to retreat from painful analysis and indecision into 
unconsciousness, represented by sleep, or into his imagination, represented most vividly 
by the underwater “chambers” and mermaids with which the poem ends. But in the last 
line, Prufrock shows that he knows his imagination provides only temporary escape and 
not real resolution of questions that pulse through the poem. His reverie ends when 
“human voices wake us, and we drown” (line 131). Since he inevitably must return to 
reality, represented by the “human voices,” and since that return causes him to “drown,” 
we see that his reveries have no power to provide rational basis for action, establish 
mutually intelligible communication, create meaning, or give him life after death. 
So we see that reveries and imagination may give each character entertainment 
and distraction but never complete fulfillment. Recognizing Rousseau’s Reveries of a 
Solitary Walker, Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground, and Eliot’s “The Love Song of 
J. Alfred Prufrock” as part of the same reverie mode highlights the continuity of human 
experience across distinct historical periods, sociological contexts, and continents. 
Matlaw claims that hyperconsciousness is part of “the tragedy of the modern man,”120 
and Belinski and Mikov described Dostoevsky's "literary method…as an analysis of the 
soul and mind of modern man."
121
 While the exact cultural and historical context into 
which Dostoevsky writes may be unique, the reverie mode allows us to see that the 
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human experience Dostoevsky captures are not uniquely modern. Similarly, the stream of 
consciousness technique, to which I argue that the reverie mode is a predecessor, is 
considered distinctly modern and is often associated with the psychological shock and 
disillusionment following the World Wars. Again, while that technique does not develop 
until the twentieth century, the reverie genre demonstrates that similar human experiences 
and attempts to capture them in literature had existed for centuries.
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                                                      Chapter 3 
Longing for a New Order: Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” 
 
Dostoevsky wrote into a culture soaked in Romanticism’s influence and in 
responses against it. The Underground Man embodies some Romantic values, but he is 
ultimately designed as an argument against Romanticism (among other things). T. S. 
Eliot, too, incorporates some components of Romanticism into his literary philosophy 
although he rejects Romanticism as a whole. During his undergraduate years at Harvard 
(1906-10), Eliot studied under Irving Babbitt, whom Louis Simpson names as one of the 
three most influential figures in Eliot’s “life and thought.”122 Babbitt considered 
Rousseau a symbol of the Romantic movement, which Babbitt saw as encouraging a 
dangerous elevation of emotionalism, individuality, and unrestrained imagination over 
intellect and control.123 Babbitt taught that one could produce art superior to the 
Romantics’ by embracing humanism, which balanced emotion with reason and exercised 
a “disciplined” imagination.124 Embracing Babbitt’s views,125 Eliot shaped his entire 
career, in a sense, as a response against the Romantic aesthetic principles Rousseau 
embodied.  
 Seeking to develop his work as a poet along a non-Romantic trajectory, the young 
Eliot was frustrated to find that his contemporaries wrote only what Simpson calls 
“watered-down Romanticism,” leaving Eliot to look to other times and places for 
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examples to imitate.126 He was drawn to European culture, and after graduating from 
Harvard he left for Sorbonne University in Paris, where he pursued graduate study under 
Alain Fournier. Among those he studied under Fournier was Fyodor Dostoevsky; during 
the same years, 1910-11, he began writing “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock.” 
Specifically, Eliot was reading Crime and Punishment while writing “Prufrock,” and 
several scholars point out resemblances between Prufrock and Raskolnikov. Among 
others similarities, both characters wander through city streets under the tormenting 
weight of indecision; both experience intense self-consciousness; both associate stairs 
with a specific dreaded action; and both find themselves lonely in a large city.127 I argue 
that strong similarities also exist between Prufrock and the Underground Man, and, 
furthermore, that both use the reverie mode.  
 
“The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” shows many of general characteristics I 
associate with the reverie genre. The narrator expresses meandering thoughts as he walks 
aimlessly through winding, “half-deserted streets” (line 4). The poem emphasizes his 
internal experience. Like Rousseau and the Underground Man, Prufrock suffers from 
internal conflict and indecision and lacks confidence in his own identity. His poem flows 
from that tension. One of component of Dostoevsky’s work that Eliot most admired was 
his ability to probe the disturbing depths of the human mind even as it operated under 
normal circumstances. In his essay entitled “Beyle and Balzac,” Eliot wrote that  
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Dostoevsky’s point of departure is always the human brain in a human 
environment, and the ‘aura’ is simply the continuation of the quotidian experience 
of the brain into seldom explored extremities of torture. Because people are too 
unconscious of their own suffering to suffer much, this continuation appears 
fantastic. But Dostoevsky begins with the real world, as Beyle does; he only 
pursues reality farther in a certain direction.128 
 
Eliot speaks of people who don’t understand their own experiences and of the ability of 
an author to probe beneath the surface of the human mind and soul in order to discover 
deeper layers of consciousness beneath daily experience. Notes from Underground 
exemplifies this ability of Dostoevsky’s, and “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” 
seems like an attempt to develop or imitate that skill. 
 
A Reverie Poem 
 “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” is most commonly categorized as a 
dramatic monologue.
129
 Reveries do share certain characteristics with dramatic 
monologues;
130
 for example, both present a single character’s voice and point of view. 
Nevertheless, I argue that reveries deserve to be distinguished from dramatic monologues 
for many of the same reasons for which they are distinguished from confessions. 
Confessions and dramatic monologues are essentially methods of communication from 
the speaker to the reader or to another (albeit silent) character. The intention to 
communicate presupposes the existence of both an audience and a message. The speakers 
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of reveries, as we have discussed, hold an ambiguous relationship to their audience, 
speaking as though they wish to be overheard but explicitly denying their audience’s 
existence.
131
 In his discussion of historical antecedents for the stream of consciousness 
technique, Melvin Friedman writes that in Reveries of a Solitary Walker, “Rousseau 
holds up his own thoughts, in the process of formation."
132
 Confessions and dramatic 
monologues serve as packages in which to present one’s thoughts; reveries (both Reveries 
of a Solitary Walker and other members of the genre) capture the internal processes 
through which those thoughts are formed. 
 As is the case in Reveries of a Solitary Walker and Notes from Underground, the 
priority placed on the speaker’s thought process in “The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock” is evident in its organization of ideas. The poem follows no obviously logical 
progression of ideas but meanders along with Prufrock’s thoughts from questions to 
external images, back to internal tensions, among past, present, and imagined worlds, and 
often returning in mental cycles to the same thoughts or variations of them. Although 
structural characteristics such as couplets and other rhyming patterns, structured stanzas, 
and literary devices such as assonance and alliteration distinguish the poem from the 
other reveries we have studied in that its form is not “shapeless” as Rousseau said of his 
Reveries (8) or lacking “system or method” (Notes from Underground, 37), the ideas it 
contains are not presented in a formally structured way. While Eliot’s technique shows 
formal intentionality on the author’s part, the content of the poem reflects the uncontrived 
and unpredictable nature of his character’s thoughts. 
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Secondly, “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufock” shows the same undefined 
relationship between speaker and audience that characterizes the other reveries. Like 
Underground Man, who repeatedly addresses the “gentlemen,” Prufrock opens the poem 
with the line, “Let us go then, you and I” (line 1) and scatters references to “you” 
throughout the rest of the poem. At first glance, this seems to be a direct address to 
another character within the poem, justifying the poem’s identification as a dramatic 
monologue, at least with respect to the issue of audience. James Miller supports this 
interpretation by noting that when asked about the identity of “you” decades after writing 
the poem, Eliot responded that while he did not remember very clearly, he was “prepared 
to assert that the 'you' in 'The Love Song' is merely some friend or companion, 
presumably of the male sex, whom the speaker is at that moment addressing."
133
 Miller 
suggests that this companion could have been Harold Peters, a friend of Eliot’s with 
whom he often took walks through the city.
134
 Alternatively, Prufrock could be 
addressing readers outside of the world of the poem directly, calling them to associate 
themselves with the speaker and his experience as expressed in the poem. 
 A third reading, however, gives reason to question whether “you” exists as person 
distinct from the poem’s “I,” meaning Prufrock. Many scholars point out that Prufrock 
suffers from a “split consciousness” in which one part of his mind thinks and acts while 
another observes and responds. According to this interpretation, “you” and “I” represent 
components of this split consciousness. Several scholars interpret images in the poem as 
demonstrating Prufrock’s internal division. A. R. Jones identifies Prufrock as the “patient 
etherized upon a table” (line 3), as if prepared for dissection or analysis which Prufrock 
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himself goes on to perform in the rest of the poem.
135
 He divides himself in two in order 
to be both inspected and inspector. Spurr points out that Prufrock alludes to his “dual 
identity” by comparing himself to a “pair of ragged claws” (line 74, emphasis added) 
rather than to a single creature.
136
 Elizabeth Schneider highlights the more dramatic 
images of Prufrock seeing his own “nerves” being projected onto a wall (line 105) and 
his “head…brought in upon a platter” (line 82).137 Finally, unlike the Underground Man 
and the gentlemen, who remain sharply at odds with each other, “you” and “I” always 
appear in the same lines, seem closely associated with each other, and merge into “we” at 
the end of the poem (lines 129,131).
138
 Whichever interpretation one chooses, the 
existence of conflicting plausible explanations of the whether “you” refers to a distinct 
person or a component of Prufrock’s mind aligns the poem more closely with the reverie 
mode than with the dramatic monologue.  
 Finally, the motivation Prufrock’s reverie as recorded in the poem matches 
Rousseau’s and the Underground Man’s apparent purpose in writing Reveries of a 
Solitary Walker and Notes from Underground, respectively. Prufrock does not explicitly 
state his reason for writing, as Rousseau and the Underground Man do; in fact, he is not 
writing in the same sense that the other two are. He is not identical to the author himself, 
as Rousseau is in Reveries, nor does he, as a created character, undertake his own writing 
project as the Underground Man does.
139
 In fact, one of the poem’s central themes is the 
essential impossibility of honest, mutually intelligible communication, expressed most 
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potently in Prufrock’s exclamation, “It is impossible to say just what I mean!” (line 
104).
140
 Nevertheless, there are identifiable parallels between the reasons for which 
Rousseau and the Underground Man write and those that prompt Prufrock’s thoughts, 
which the poem captures. All three seek to analyze and understand themselves better and 
seek to release internal tensions; they enter reveries for their own benefit and not to create 
a product to present to the public.  
Prufrock shows a distinct lack of confidence in his own identity, and for the most 
of the poem, he cannot find a satisfactory way to define himself. His search for insight 
into his own character parallels Rousseau’s, who wrote in Reveries that since writing 
Confessions he has lost his confidence in his understanding of his own character 
(Reveries 60), and the Underground Man’s, who says he has “taken up my pen” in order 
to “get to the bottom of” the strange “enjoyment” of pain he finds within himself (Notes 
from Underground, 8). As mentioned earlier, Eliot’s poem opens with an image of a 
“patient etherized up on the table” (line 3), as though Prufrock himself is preparing to be 
dissected. Over the course of the poem, he shifts his attention from a specific dilemma 
about whether to attend the social gathering to questions about his own identity. Spurr 
calls the whole second portion of the poem an "attempt at self-definition.”141 Prufrock 
does not engage in pure and direct introspection or explicitly describe his character 
qualities or personality. Instead, images, recollections, and speculation about possible 
actions create a patchwork of insights into Prufrock’s character that he seems to be trying 
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to fit together into a cohesive whole. In the process, he compares himself to numerous 
literary figures, historical figures, and animals, including a cat, a crab, a bug, John the 
Baptist, Lazarus, Hamlet, Polonius, and a Shakespearean Fool. Each comparison has 
specific, relevant connotations; but for now, we may see that the wide variety and number 
of beings to which Prufrock attempts to compare himself reveals the depth of his 
uncertainty in his own identity.  
Secondly, just as the Underground Man recorded his musings in search of relief 
from oppressive memories, a tone of longing for resolution of tension colors Eliot’s 
poem. Several different tensions are expressed. Most obviously, he explores the opposing 
forces of his desire for effective action and his indecisiveness leading to paralysis of the 
will. The opening stanza begins and ends with statements of intended action: “Let us go 
then, you and I,” and “Let us go and make our visit” (lines 1, 12). But the more Prufrock 
thinks about the action he has just proposed, the more we see his “inertia,” as the 
Underground Man called it – his internal drawing back from movement. Every proposal 
of action triggers mental wandering in an opposite direction. After that initial statement 
of intended action (line 1), his mind immediately retreats to the image of “the evening 
spread out against the sky” and a winding network of streets. The image of a “spread out” 
evening has no direction or movement and represents his withdrawal from the idea of 
making his visit.
142
 Similarly, when he suggests to himself a possible way to begin the 
conversation (“Shall I say…”), his thoughts tend almost immediately towards the 
“narrow streets” and “smoke” (lines 70-71) that represent aimlessness and a lack of 
intentionality. 
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 Secondly, we see two related tensions between social needs and a bent towards 
independence. First, he feels pressure to conform to social norms, represented by his 
“morning coat, my collar mounting firmly to the chin, / My necktie rich and modest, but 
asserted by a simple pin” (lines 42-43), as well as by the references to tea party etiquette 
(lines 34, 102). His internalization of social norms can be seen in his fear of breaking 
them,143 but we see an internal force opposing that one in images of rebellion against 
social expectations. Miller points out that to “wear the bottoms of my trousers rolled” and 
“part my hair behind” (lines 121, 122) were new fashions at Eliot’s time, representing his 
rebellion against traditional norms.144 Kenner also notes that according to standard 
visiting procedures, a visitor would be announced to the guests in an upstairs room before 
he entered the gathering; so if Prufrock has reached the point where he can “turn back 
and descend the stair” (line 39, emphasis added), he must have already been announced 
to the guests. To leave at that point without entering the room would constitute a blatant 
breach in etiquette.145  
But Prufrock’s internal conflict does not revolve only around meeting external 
expectations; he also feels torn between a deep desire for personal connection and fear of 
others’ criticism. The whole poem is motivated by his desire to express his interest in one 
of the women at the gathering, and according to Spurr, the image of greatest resolution 
and peace in the whole poem is the connection between Prufrock and the imaginary “sea-
girls” in the closing lines (129-30).146 But images of unmitigated loneliness also fill the 
                                                 
143
 The Underground Man acknowledges the same fear. He writes, “I was morbidly afraid of being 
ridiculous, and so I slavishly worshiped the conventional in everything external. I loved to fall into the 
common rut, and had a whole-hearted terror of any kind of eccentricity in myself” (Notes from 
Underground, 41). 
144
 Miller, T. S. Eliot, 158. 
145
 Kenner, The Invisible Poet, 21. 
146
 Spurr, Conflicts in Consciousness, 11. 
 96 
poem, and Prufrock feels powerless to change his isolation. In the first stanza, he walks 
through “half-deserted streets” (4), and if “you and I” are both components of himself, he 
walks alone. He speaks of “prepar[ing] a face to meet the faces that you meet” (27), 
implying that even when he does see other people, only their constructed exteriors 
interact. Later, after claiming to have “known them all already” (49), he clarifies: “I have 
known the eyes already” (55) and “I have known the arms already” (62). None of his 
interactions constitute genuine relationships; they are expressed in terms of isolated body 
parts because the people have no meaningful connection beneath their surface-level 
conversations. When he finally suggests to himself what he might say to the woman, he 
begins, “I have gone at dusk through narrow streets / And watched the smoke that rises 
from the pipes / Of lonely men in shirt-sleeves, leaning out of windows” (70-72). He 
perceives the city as full of “lonely men” because he is one; he also offers social critique 
of the urban setting, in which people can be surrounded by other people and still alone. 
But again Prufrock’s reverie is not primarily a message to others, pointing out flaws in 
their system and demanding change; it is primarily an expression of his own doubts and 
desires. He reaches no conclusion to present to an audience, as would be the case were he 
speaking a dramatic monologue. The poem captures unpredictable twists and turns of his 
thoughts, showing one of the defining characteristics of the stream of consciousness 
technique that would develop during Eliot’s century. 
 So we see that “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” shows the general 
characteristics of the reverie genre – emphasis on the speaker’s internal experience and a 
combination of purposeful thought and undirected day-dreaming presented through a 
narrator’s disjointed, repetitive, self-doubting thoughts without acknowledging the 
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reader’s existence. Anthony Cuda calls the poem a "prolonged scrutiny of one's own fears 
and weaknesses” through which Eliot “opens a window onto the soul's inner world.”147 It 
also shares the three characteristics that distinguish reveries from confessions and 
dramatic monologues: it leaves uncertainty about whether its intended audience includes 
others or only the narrator’s self, it is written for the narrator’s benefit rather than for 
purposes of communication, and it is accordingly organized by the narrator’s thought 
progression and not a logical or chronological structure. Using the reverie genre, Eliot 
captures a similar human experience to the Underground Man’s and Rousseau’s: that of 
an imaginative dreamer caught in hyperconsciousness.  
 
Life, Death, and In Between: Trapped in Hyperconsciousness 
 Like Rousseau and the Underground Man, Prufrock retreats from uncertainty or 
emotional distress in his life to his imagination. In one sense, the entire poem is an 
expression of his imagination, since it all occurs within his mind and he takes no external 
action (except perhaps walking through the city as he thinks). Spurr describes Eliot’s 
poetry as “often dreamlike in quality” and portraying a “descent to a submerged inner 
world”148 that parallels Dostoevsky’s underground world. More specifically, however, we 
see an example of Prufrock’s underground imagination in the images of the mermaids. If 
the “beach” (line 124) represents the boundary between active thought and release into 
unconsciousness or imagination,
149
 Prufrock gladly crosses it to enter the “chambers of 
the sea” in which his imagined world seems more present than reality. His desire for 
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retreat from reality shows that other being with other people seems to constitute a form of 
hell for him. 
 Prufrock also experiences the same categories of hyperconsciousness that 
Rousseau and the Underground Man do. We have already discussed Prufrock’s self-
analysis and, in Chapter 1, we mentioned how his fear of the criticism he imagines 
receiving prevents him from attending the gathering. He imagines pausing at the top of 
the stairs to 
 wonder, “Do I dare?” and, “Do I dare?” 
 …With a bald spot in the middle of my hair –  
 (They will say: “How his hair growing thin!”) 
 My morning coat, my collar mounting firmly to the chin,  
 My necktie rich and modest, but asserted by a simple pin –  
 (They will say: “But how his arms and legs are thin!”) 
 Do I dare 
 Disturb the universe? (38-46) 
 
His hesitation comes from the response he anticipates from other people. Even his 
successful efforts at putting together a presentable outfit do not defend him from the 
women’s criticism. His clothes are “firm,” “rich and modest,” implying competence, 
confidence, and social propriety. These adjectives constitute one of the few positive self-
descriptions Prufrock gives. The women he imagines, however, show no interest in his 
clothes; they criticize his body. It is as though they can see past the artificial image 
Prufrock creates to the weakness (represented by baldness, which indicates aging) and 
incompetence (or lack of youthful strength as indicated by his thin limbs) beneath. The 
possibility of receiving their condescension turns even his thoughts away from the idea of 
making his visit. He retreats into the comfort an endless cycle of “decisions and revisions 
which a minute will reverse” (line 48), showing his hyper-self-conscious fear of his 
image before others. 
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 Even before Prufrock names the dilemma of whether to visit the woman he is 
thinking about, the epigraph points to Prufrock’s hyper-self-consciousness. In the 
epigraph, taken from Dante’s Inferno,150 a soul in hell says because he believes that no 
listeners will return to earth to spread reports of what he said, “Without fear of infamy I 
answer.” He implies that if news of his words were to reach humans on earth, he would 
fear infamy and would not answer. Prufrock, being still on earth, cannot bring himself to 
speak honestly, showing the same “fear of infamy.” This persistent fear torments 
Prufrock and makes living in society seem to him comparable to hell.  
Prufrock experiences hyperconsciousness that parallels Rousseau’s and the 
Underground Man’s sense of possessing deeper insight into human nature and the nature 
of the universe than most people around him do. Prufrock portrays upper class Bostonian 
society as overcivilized but, as A. R. Jones says, “suffering from emotional and 
intellectual starvation."
151
 Others are concerned with Michaelangelo (line 14), “toast and 
tea” (line 34), “novels…teacups…[and] skirts” (102), while he, like the Underground 
Man, suffers from unmet needs of which his society seems totally unaware. He takes his 
social critique one step further than the Underground Man does, according to Arden’s 
interpretation, by showing other members of society as not only misguided and 
concerned with petty things but “spiritually dead.”152 In his hyperconsciousness, or 
heightened sensitivity to the meaninglessness of contemporary society’s values, Prufrock 
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seeks a new form of order other than the existing social structure to reign in the chaos 
that seems innate in the universe and to give more meaning to his life than he has yet 
found. David Spurr points to Prufrock’s desire to “murder and create” and “Disturb the 
universe” (lines 28, 46) as evidence that he finds wants to overturn the current forms of 
order and find something more meaningful and purposeful to counteract the universe’s 
tendency towards disorder.
153
  
Eliot experienced a similar search for order and purpose; he sought aesthetic 
principles and religious truth to guide his work and life. Following Babbitt’s lead, he 
rejected Romanticism for its lack of “discipline,” among other things, and adopted 
humanism as Babbitt did. Later, however, he found humanism too to be lacking the order 
he sought, and he turned to religion and joined the Anglican Church in 1927.
154
 Prufrock 
is a created character and not explicitly Eliot himself; but critics agree that Prufrock 
seems to be only a thin fictional mask for Eliot that allows him to explore his own 
emotions and experiences without being labeled an emotional or confessional poet.
155
 
Elizabeth Schneider writes this: "Prufrock was Eliot, though Eliot was much more than 
Prufrock. …Eliot was not either the dedicated apostle in theory, or the great exemplar in 
practice, of complete 'depersonalization' in poetry that one influential early essay of his 
for a time led readers to suppose."
156
 If we take Prufrock as a representation of Eliot, 
incomplete though it is, we can see shadows of Eliot’s religious questions under the 
surface of Prufrock’s dilemma and search for order. 
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The most prominent religious question in “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” 
is the existence of hell and life after death. The poem begins in hell with the epigraph 
from Dante’s Inferno. The poem ends Prufrock being called out of his reverie back to 
reality, but he expresses the return to reality as the time when “human voices wake us, 
and we drown” (131). If returning to life is death, the rest of life is life after death.157 For 
Prufrock, who seems to have no connection to God, life after death is hell. In fact, the 
whole poem is often interpreted as representing a living hell. Schneider calls it a “portrait 
of a man in Hell.”158 Hell for him is both the self-consciousness he experiences in a 
watching society and the internal division of a split consciousness. Schneider points out 
that Prufrock uses “violent images [to] convey the extremes of self-shattering 
consciousness”; and these, she says, convince the reader that "we are visiting a kind of 
hell."
159
 Referring to the passage in which Prufrock describes the “eyes that fix you in a 
formulated phrase” (line 56), Schneider calls Prufrock a “specimen insect impaled, to be 
stared at in its death agony as it ejects its insides.” She points out the violence involved in 
displaying “one’s own nervous system” on a wall, and finally to the “agonized split self” 
represented by Prufrock watching his head “brought in upon a platter” (line 83). By 
associating hyperconsciousness with death and hell, Prufrock surpasses even the 
Underground Man in the extent to which he expresses the pain that comes with 
hyperconsciousness. The Underground Man called it a “disease” – unwanted and 
unhealthy, but still belonging to the realm of life. 
Prufrock’s questions regarding life after death extend beyond the existence of 
hell, however. Many of the people to whom he compares himself are those who have 
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returned from the dead with a message for the living, or who have interacted with those 
who have done so. First, as we have mentioned, the speaker of the epigraph falsely 
believes that Dante will never return to earth after hearing his message; Dante does return 
from hell to the living world, and perhaps writing Inferno constitutes passing on the 
message intended to stay in the underworld. Later, as Prufrock questions his identity, he 
says, “I am not Prince Hamlet” (line 111), whose torturous indecision hinges in part on 
his uncertainty about whether the apparition he saw was truly his father’s spirit, coming 
from purgatory to speak to him, or a demon sent from hell to deceive him. Prufrock does 
not feel his condition of paralyzed indecision worthy of comparison to Hamlet’s, but even 
denying his identicality to Hamlet highlights some similarity in their experiences and 
their questions about life after death.  
Before denying that he is Hamlet, Prufrock compares himself to Lazarus, who 
would know what happens after death. Prufrock allows the possibility of a greater degree 
of similarity between himself and Lazarus when he asks, “Would it have been worth 
while, … / To say: ‘I am Lazarus, come from the dead, / Come back to tell you all” (lines 
90, 94, 95). Lazarus appears in the Bible both as a man Jesus raised from the dead and as 
a character in a parable Jesus tells, in which a rich man in hell asks Abraham in heaven to 
send Lazarus (also in heaven) to earth to warn the rich man’s family that hell is real.160 
Prufrock does not specify what it would mean to “tell you all” (line 95), but one may 
speculate that the poem itself constitutes his message to the rest of society about the 
reality of the hell of hyperconsciousness. He also expresses again the implicit question of 
whether it is possible to return to earth after death and even seems to question whether 
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such a return is a prerequisite for communicating truth. Hamlet’s father can tell him about 
his uncle’s affair and treason only after his death, and the rich man in the parable believes 
that Lazarus’s message will carry more weight with his family than “Moses and the 
Prophets,” whose writings Abraham points out that they already have.161 Prufrock has so 
far found it “impossible to say just what I mean” while on earth (line 104), but if he were 
Lazarus it seems that he could speak more fully. His reference to John the Baptist, 
however, expresses fear that for one who has not died, speaking openly will bring death. 
John the Baptist’s head was literally “brought in upon a platter” because he condemned 
King Herod for taking his brother’s wife, and she prompted her daughter to ask for John’s 
head in response to the King’s promise of any gift she named.162  
Prufrock finds no answers. Nevertheless, the questions underlying his words – 
questions about what happens after death and the connection between death and the 
ability to communicate effectively – show his consciousness of issues beyond most 
socialites’ concerns. The relationship between Eliot and Prufrock mirrors that between 
Dostoevsky and the Underground Man: the narrators ask the authors’ questions but never 
find their answers.
163
 Dostoevky believed people needed Jesus and Russian Orthodox 
Christianity,
164
 but he does not give the Underground Man that option in the published 
version of Notes from Underground. The Underground Man knows what he does not 
want – materialism, rationality, or the underground – but Dostoevsky leaves him longing 
for "something…which I cannot find" (Notes 35) and never finds within Notes. Prufrock 
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asks more specific questions and seems to come closer to an answer. Eliot seems to wish 
he were more similar to those who have some obvious connection to God, such as a 
prophet or one whom He raised from the dead. But Prufrock himself finds no such 
connection. This too reflects the nature of the reverie genre; it tends to capture questions 
rather than answers. 
That Prufrock and the Underground Man ask spiritual questions at all can be seen 
as a commentary on the consequences of the urban environment that both inhabit. When 
Rousseau found society oppressive but still longed to belong to a system greater than 
himself (despite his claims of self-sufficiency), he immersed himself in intensive study of 
plants. In the Seventh Walk, after describing nature’s beauty and the joy he finds in the 
sensations nature produces, he writes that “My meditations and reveries are never more 
delightful than when I forget myself. I feel ecstasy and inexpressible rapture when I melt, 
so to speak, into the system of beings and identify myself with the whole of nature” 
(Reveries 74). Finding a pleasant connection to the natural world, Rousseau seeks no 
further. Perhaps the distance urbanization creates between people and the natural world 
motivates the Underground Man and Prufrock to seek meaning and identification with 
something greater than themselves in the supernatural world.  
 
In “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” the inaction that flows from Prufrock’s 
hyperconsciousness is even more central than it is for the Underground Man or Rousseau; 
it is the center of his frustration and the impetus for his self-doubt and his departure into 
the world of his dreams for escape. His desire for purpose and order gives him no solid 
basis for action. Prufrock longs to “murder” and “disturb” existing forms of social order 
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because of their inability to give life meaning. And yet he fails to “create” or discover an 
alternative source of meaning, and so finds himself floating without an anchor or a 
rudder, tossed back and forth by his desire to resist the cultural current that would have 
him squash his inner conflict and simply go through the motions of sociability and his 
lack of sufficient motivation or conflict to do so. Therefore, trapped between his 
frustration with inertia and his fear of others’ reactions to any he might take action, he 
does nothing. 
Prufrock’s hyper-self-conscious anxiety regarding his image before others lead 
him to another form of inaction: he feels incapable of taking any action that is unexpected 
or inconsistent with others’ expectations of him. His feeling of entrapment is most clearly 
illustrated in this passage: he believes that visiting the women will subject him to 
The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase, 
 And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin, 
 When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall, 
 Then how should I begin 
 To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways? 
  And how should I presume? (56-61) 
 
Prufrock imagines that other guests have a “formulated phrase” for him – a single, set 
way they have already decided to see him. That “phrase” restricts him like a pin holding 
an insect in place in a display. Although he can “wiggle,” or slightly alter his position 
before them through insignificant things such as proper clothing, he feels no freedom to 
do anything outside what is prescribed by that “phrase.” He knows that “the butt-ends of 
my days and ways” are so different than what members of his society expect from him 
that he cannot bring himself to express his true feelings. “Butt-ends” summons the image 
of a cigarette butt – what is left over after the cigarette has served its purpose. According 
to society’s expectations, Prufrock can serve his purpose simply by attending the 
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gathering and acting according to social conventions; his emotions, inner conflict, and 
desire for more genuine connections are discardable and unwanted, like cigarette butts. 
He feels confined by others’ opinions of him and unable to act.  
Prufrock’s self-analysis leads to inaction because his dissatisfaction with what he 
finds in himself tempts him to long for escape into unconsciousness. Images of sleep are 
scattered throughout the poem. Two have already been mentioned: the “etherized patient” 
and the sleeping cat. Ether anesthetizes, and Prufrock’s tone as he contrasts his walk 
through the city with the unconscious evening indicates that he would rather be the 
anesthetized evening. The fog-cat of lines 15-22 floats through the city like Prufrock 
does, but it is under no compulsion to enter any of the buildings. It comes close to social 
gatherings, “rub[bing] its back upon the window panes”  (15) and “curl[ing] once about 
the house” (22), but instead of going in or saying anything, it “fell asleep” (22). Because 
his introspection has shown him the depth of his social and communicative inadequacy, 
Prufrock would prefer to escape social interaction into sleep. These images reappear 
several stanzas later with a more clear contrast between Prufrock and the evening and cat. 
After claiming he should be a silent crab under the sea, he writes, “And the afternoon, the 
evening, sleeps so peacefully! / Smoothed by long fingers, / Asleep…tired…or it 
malingers, / Stretched on the floor, here beside you and me. / Should I, after tea and cakes 
and ices, / Have the strength to force the moment to its crisis?” (75-80). The juxtaposition 
of his question with the image of the sleeping evening-cat demands a negative answer – 
or at least implies that he wants to answer, “no,” and that he would rather stretch out on 
the floor and go to sleep, where he might find “peace” instead of “crisis.” But again, this 
desire for unconsciousness and resulting inaction comes from his assurance of his own 
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incompetence, which he has gained through self-analysis. If he thought he had the 
strength, it seems unlikely that he would still want to retreat into sleep. 
 
Like Rousseau and the Underground Man, he retreats from life as he has found it 
into an imagined life, represented by the world under the ocean. In the world accessible 
through reverie, Prufrock does find order and intimacy. As mentioned earlier, the world 
of waves and mermaids exists in a state of “organic order” in which characters and their 
surroundings interact in natural harmony with no need for Prufrock or anyone else to 
impose an external, rationally defined order on them.
165
 Spurr expands his analysis of this 
passage as providing resolution to tensions that had existed throughout the poem. He had 
earlier identified Prufrock’s desire for purposeful action and his environment’s tendency 
toward aimless activity as opposing forces. But here, there is no tension between 
Prufrock’s attempted momentum towards a specific question and the women who 
aimlessly “come and go” (line 13) and whose arms “lie along a table, or wrap about a 
shawl” (67), mirroring the distracting, directionless motion of the fog (which “slides 
along the street” (25) and “curled about the house” (22)). Instead, the “chambers of the 
sea” (129) provide intimacy, compatibility, and union of purpose. 
And yet both Spurr and Prufrock recognize that these dreams, too, are 
insufficient. Spurr calls them an “escape as much as resolution" and points out that 
although the tensions of the rest of the poem do not follow Prufrock into his reverie, the 
poem’s major questions have not been answered.166 Although like Rousseau Prufrock 
enjoys his reveries more than the Underground Man does, like both he recognizes that 
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they can only be temporary and are not objectively real. His imagined world is held under 
the control of time, which dominated so much of the earlier portion of the poem, which 
cuts his dream short when “human voices wake us, and we drown” (line 132). Here 
Prufrock expresses both that he finds life in his reveries, since their end is death, and that 
he knows they are not real, since it is “human” voices, not those of mermaids singing, 
that bring him out of his reverie. 
 
Modern Consciousness is Not New 
Eliot’s central message consists at least partially in social critique. Through 
Prufrock’s experience, Eliot highlights a phenomenon that the Underground Man also 
experienced: people have acquaintances but remain lonely because they have only 
interacted as superficial exterior “faces” (line 27) concerned with tea, ties and art. Other 
than this social critique, no central conclusions emerge. Jones writes that "Prufrock, if it 
stands for anything, stands for the resignation or despair of a world searching, not for the 
answers to the human predicament, but for the appropriate, the meaningful questions."
167
 
The lack of resolution in “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” characterizes the reverie 
genre.  
By comparing “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” to Notes from Underground 
and Reveries of Solitary Walker, we see a continuity of the human experience captured by 
the reverie mode in slowly evolving technique. After analyzing Reveries of a Solitary 
Walker, we concluded that Rousseau provided insight into the varying levels of 
consciousness, an uncommon idea at his time. He stopped at describing their existence, 
however, and did not attempt to give the reader insight into the actual experience of sub-
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consciousness processes. Dostoevsky, too, is often acclaimed for his ability to capture 
human psychology in fiction. As the reverie mode enters the twentieth century in “The 
Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” however, it begins to approach stream of 
consciousness technique. Lawrence Bowling characterizes stream of consciousness 
technique (and distinguishes it from the internal monologue) by its attempt to express 
images and sensations that would not ordinarily be expressed in language within one’s 
mind.
168
 For example, Prufrock would likely notice “the yellow fog that rubs its back 
upon the window-panes” (line 15) as a mental image without narrating his movement 
within his mind; but the poem captures the image as well.  
The term reverie connotes additional characteristics that not all stream of 
consciousness writing shares, such as the narrator’s self-doubt, unresolved tensions and 
questions, and continual concern with his image according to other people’s perspectives. 
An essential element shared between the reverie mode and stream of consciousness 
writing is the piece’s limitation to a single, non-omniscient narrator’s individual 
experiences, expressed through a record of unfiltered, unstructured, undirected thoughts. 
Both Dostoevsky and Eliot were considered to be capturing uniquely modern experiences 
of dissociation from society, isolation in urban settings, and harmful psychological 
processes. Seeing Notes from Underground and “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” 
as part of the reverie mode and both influenced by Reveries of a Solitary Walker, 
however, places not only these works but these experiences in a larger context of similar 
human experiences prior to urbanization. Each author modifies the technique, but the 
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narrators’ internal experiences are surprisingly similar – and therefore, not uniquely 
modern. 
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Conclusion: The Reveries and Beyond 
The reverie genre is designed to express the narrator’s reveries. Reveries – and 
here I mean the state of being lost in thought or allowing one’s mind to wander – come in 
various forms. Reveries can lead to an impressionable state in which one primarily 
receives sensations from physical surroundings, as Rousseau describes in his Fifth Walk, 
to contemplation of philosophical topics, or to analysis of one’s own character, past, 
memories, and motivations. Reveries can also lead to speculation about one’s appearance 
before others and to the imagination of non-existent people and events. But in addition to 
expressing the narrator’s reveries, the reverie mode is also defined by certain 
characteristics of the way in which it expresses the narrator’s thoughts. It places emphasis 
on the process of thinking and not only on the ideas or conclusions produced by that 
process. The reverie writer allows the reader to see the narrator’s thoughts as they are 
being formed, in the order and condition in which they first appear to the thinker. The 
second characteristic follows from the previous one: a reverie does not restructure and 
reorganize the narrator’s thoughts in order to present them more simply or logically to the 
reader. Finally, the reverie gives the reader some reason to question whether it is directed 
at a reader at all or only created for the narrator’s own sake;169 there must at least be some 
sense in which the reverie is written for the narrator’s benefit rather than as a means of 
interpersonal communication.  
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 Based on Reveries of a Solitary Walker, Notes from Underground, and “The Love 
Song of J. Alfred Prufrock,” we found several striking similarities among the 
personalities and experiences of the reverie writers.
170
 Some of these character qualities 
and similar experiences likely preceded their engagement in reveries and prompted them 
to lose themselves in thought, while others resulted from repeated reveries. Each narrator 
finds himself in some form of isolation – either physical exile on a scarcely-inhabited 
island or urban isolation in which he is surrounded by people, of whom he considers few 
to be acquaintances and none friends. Their disconnection from society prompts two 
forms of reverie: self-analyzing introspection and speculation about abstract ideas that 
reveals a desire to be part of something beyond oneself. Rousseau finds a connection to a 
greater system in his study of botany; Prufrock wonders about life after death and the 
possibility of connection to God; the Underground Man finds nothing to satisfy this 
desire but states the need more explicitly than the others. Spending excessive time lost in 
one’s own mind, however, has apparently real negative consequences. Despite the extent 
to which each narrator thinks about how he will appear before others, he struggles to 
actually understand others’ perspectives. His focus on ideals or imagining of idealized 
experiences makes him resist real, in-person interactions that are necessarily 
unpredictable and not ideal. Having a narrator who shares these and other characteristics 
with the three narrators we have studied is not a necessary criterion for qualification as a 
reverie. Nevertheless, it seems likely that other reverie writers will share at least some of 
the experiences and character qualities that either lead to or result from reveries. The 
extent to which the three narrators on which we have focused resemble each other shows, 
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I believe, some evidence that latter two authors were familiar with and responding to the 
earlier two’s work.   
  
When we attempt to apply this definition of the reverie genre to works besides 
these three, we find elements of the reverie genre in various places. There are two 
categories of cases that meet some but not all the conditions for qualification as a reverie. 
The first category contains works that describe the narrator’s or another characters’ 
experiences of reveries – that is, of allowing one’s mind to wander into self-analysis, 
philosophical contemplation, enjoyment of nature, or another form – but do not present 
the reverie experience in a manner consistent with the reverie genre. Virginia Woolf’s A 
Room of One’s Own provides an example of one such work. The narrator explains to the 
reader that she will "do what I can to show you how I arrived at this opinion…. I am 
going to develop in your presence as fully and freely as I can the train of thought which 
led me to” her central conclusion, namely, that “a woman must have money and a room 
of her own if she is to write fiction.”171 This train of thought began as she was “sitting on 
the banks of a river…lost in thought” and continues to develop as she walks through a 
university campus where, because of the beauty of her physical surroundings, the 
“roughness of the present seemed smoothed away;…and the mind, freed from any 
contact with facts…was at liberty to settle down upon whatever meditation was in 
harmony with the moment.”172  
She describes a reverie much like Rousseau’s: both choose a topic for 
contemplation and sit in or walk through nature as they think, finding peace in nature. 
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Although the experience bears strong resemblance to Rousseau’s, however, the 
presentation of the experience aligns more closely with Montaigne’s Essays. That is, she 
has reached her conclusion and now purports to communicate both it and the process by 
which she reached it to her reader. She remembers the progression of her thoughts, but 
the progression has already been completed. A proper reverie captures one’s thoughts as 
they occur. It draws the reader into an internal journey whose destination the narrator 
does not know at the outset.  
 The other category of modern literature in which we find components of the 
reverie genre is in stream of consciousness technique, whose roots I have already pointed 
out in the reveries we have discussed. One key characteristic of stream of consciousness 
technique is its attempt to express various “states and levels” of consciousness, some of 
which are immediately present in a character’s attention and some of which are closer to 
unconsciousness.
173
 Friedman identifies Reveries of a Solitary Walker as "probably the 
most original contribution of the French eighteenth century to the study of 
consciousness."
174
 We see the reverie genre’s emphasis not only on one’s internal 
experiences but on expressing thoughts “in the process of formation"175 continued and 
expanded upon in stream of consciousness writing.  
Another related characteristic of stream of consciousness technique by which 
Bowling distinguishes it from the internal monologue is its ability to capture components 
of consciousness that are not ordinarily expressed in language. At the end of Chapter 3, 
we discussed an instance of an attempt to put an image into words in “The Love Song of 
J. Alfred Prufrock.” Dostoevsky also reveals his awareness that such a technique could 
                                                 
173
 Friedman, Stream of Consciousness, 58-59. 
174
 Ibid. 56. 
175
 Ibid. 57. 
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exist (although he does not attempt to fully carry it out throughout his story) in a 
comment he makes through his narrator in An Unpleasant Predicament. He writes,  
It is well known that whole trains of thought sometimes pass through our brains 
instantaneously as though they were sensations, without being translated into 
human speech, still less into literary language. But we will try to translate these 
sensations of our hero's and present to the reader at least the kernel of them, so to 
say, what was most essential and nearest to reality in them.
176
 
 
While reveries do not necessarily put words to images, sensations, or other ideas that do 
not exist in linguistic form within one’s mind, their focus on the whole of the one’s 
internal experience provides antecedents for this endeavor.  
 
 At the end of chapters two and three, I argued that in recognizing the reverie 
genre, we find beneath the literary method a set of human experiences that are consistent 
across the centuries. Reveries and hyperconsciousness have the same effects on isolated 
individuals from Rousseau to Prufrock. Physical setting makes a difference for the 
likelihood of finding reveries enjoyable and for where individuals turn to find connection 
to something greater than themselves. Historical and cultural context make a difference in 
the content of one’s reveries (when the Underground Man contemplates philosophical 
issues, the arguments of Dostoevsky’s contemporaries are among the issues he chooses) 
and the commonness of the experiences the reverie genre tends to capture. For example, 
although strong similarities tie the Underground Man’s and Prufrock’s experiences to 
Rousseau’s, the Underground Man and Prufrock are both meant to represent and criticize 
the existence of a more widespread problem in their respective societies. 
 Our contemporary sociologists would likely recognize many of the reverie 
writers’ social critiques but attribute them, now, to the shift towards technological 
                                                 
176
 Qtd in Friedman, Stream of Consciousness, 66. 
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communication. Sherry Turkle argued in a 2012 TEDTalk that technology is creating an 
endemic of loneliness by encouraging the replacement of face-to-face conversations and 
personal relationships with virtual connections.
177
 Instead of only reading about or 
imagining alternative realities as the reverie writers do, we actually engage in virtual 
worlds in which, Turkle points out, we can edit our words and images before making 
them available to the public. Having the ability to remain almost continually “connected” 
promotes constant concern with the way we appear before others rather than with other 
people themselves. Aren’t Facebook, LinkedIn, and other social networks the perfect way 
to “prepare faces to meet the faces that we meet”? If the inability to self-edit during face-
to-face interactions makes us avoid them, are we taking one step closer to the 
Underground Man’s “divorce from reality”? Is online the new underground? 
                                                 
177
 Sherry Turkle, “Connected, but alone?” April 2012, transcript, TED Talk.  
http://www.ted.com/talks/sherry_turkle_alone_together/transcript#t-347000 
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